Cap and trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility by Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) Economics
7-6-2016
Cap and trade under transactions costs and factor
irreversibility
Rajesh Singh
Iowa State University, rsingh@iastate.edu
Quinn Weninger
Iowa State University, weninger@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Singh, Rajesh and Weninger, Quinn, "Cap and trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility" (2016). Economics Working
Papers (2002–2016). 22.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/22
Cap and trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
Abstract
We study production capacity utilization and emission permit utilization in a model where firms jointly
produce a valued good and an environmental bad, pollution. Firms are ex ante identical but experience
random productivity shocks after factor employment. A regulator imposes a cap-and-trade policy to control
pollution emissions. Trade in emission permits entails transactions costs which follow two specifications:
constant per unit trading costs or fixed trading costs. Under constant per unit trading costs, the equilibrium
outcome depends only on the total unit trading costs; the incidence of costs borne by buyers and sellers does
not matter. Under fixed costs, both buyers' and sellers' costs matter. Under proportional costs permit trade
always occurs, with either full or partial market clearing, as long as the total trading costs are below the permit
trade surplus. With fixed costs, trade is either partial or non-existent. The implication is that firms fully utilize
their production capacity for a range of proportional trading costs; capacity is never fully utilized under fixed
costs. Under proportional costs, trade is impeded most, even with small costs, when the emission cap is either
relatively high or low. There exists a non-monotonic relationship between the aggregate emissions cap and a
lower bound for trading costs that obstruct or preclude trade. Under fixed costs, a similar relationship between
emission cap and the cost threshold that precludes trade holds only if the output variance is exogenously fixed.
Otherwise, the higher the emission cap the higher is this cost threshold. In contrast to proportional costs
where capacity utilization decreases with productivity variance, the result is the opposite under fixed costs.
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but experience random productivity shocks after factor employment. A regulator imposes a cap-
and-trade policy to control pollution emissions. Trade in emission permits entails transactions
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under 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1 Introduction
We study production of a consumption good and jointly produced pollution emissions in a stochastic
environment. In our model, emissions are a by-product of a valued-good production process and increase
with the quantity of the good that is produced (Murty et. al., 2012). A regulator sets an emissions
cap that is initially allocated/auctioned to ex ante identical rms. The regulation limits the quantity
of emissions and indirectly, the quantity of consumption good produced per rm and in aggregate.
The role of markets for trading emissions permits arises naturally due to the uncertainty rms face in
production. In our model, rms experience idiosyncratic productivity shocks after factors are employed.
Firms that experience high productivity want to produce a relatively higher amount of goods and to
do so they need to purchase more permits than they hold. On the other side of the market, there are
rms with relatively lower productivity who hold permits that exceed their emissions.1 The purpose
of our study is to understand the e¢ ciency implications of transactions costs in the markets for these
emissions permits.
Our model is designed to allow a version of the rst welfare theorem to hold: a perfectly competitive
market for costless trade in emission permits produces a constrained e¢ cient equilibrium (Montgomery,
1972). Under decentralization, rms employ factor inputs, trade in permits, and produce output that
is identical to the allocations of a planner who is constrained by a total emissions target. E¢ ciency
requires that rms ex ante choose a production scale such that in the aggregate full capacity emissions
obey the cap. Ex post, i.e., after realizing their productivities, rms with excess emission permits
trade with those with shortfalls and the permit market clears. An e¢ cient production-emission plan
is thus implemented by a joint determination of optimal factor employment and permit market prices.
For example, if the cap is relatively low emission permit prices are relatively high that by raising the
opportunity cost of production ensure a suitably low factor employment. The reverse is the case when
the cap is relatively high.
In the absence of permit trade, the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. While some rms are unable to fully
utilize their production capacity due to emission constraints, others let their permits go unutilized. Ex
ante, rms optimally choose a higher production capacity relative to the capacity chosen under trade
when the emission cap is su¢ ciently low. Conversely, when the cap is su¢ ciently high, the capacity
chosen by rms is relatively lower. In either case, there is a latent supply-demand mismatch: under
high emissions cap, for example, the aggregate supply of permits exceeds the emissions that could
potentially be generated under full capacity production. The opposite is the case when the emission
cap is relatively low.2 This mismatch continues to exist and drive the equilibrium outcomes when trade
occurs with transactions costs.
While the costless trade and no-trade environments build a strong case for a cap-and-trade programs,
trade in permits is neither costless nor prohibited in practice. We study intermediate cases where trade
entails nite transaction costs, e.g., the costs of collecting information, bargaining, monitoring and
enforcing sales agreements, and perhaps, costs of fullling regulatory paperwork or other administrative
requirements. Empirical evidence suggests these costs can be of xed form, independent of trading
volume, and/or proportional to quantity traded.3
1Alternatively, the model can be modied to allow rms to di¤er in their emission e¢ ciencies ex post. Qualitatively,
the results are similar.
2 If trade were to occur ex post the latent mismatch would transform into an excess supply of permits when emission
caps are relatively high and excess demand for permits when emission caps are low.
3Heindl (2012) nds transactions costs in the European Union emissions trading scheme to be non-linear and declining
with the size of emitting rm. Generally, empirical estimates vary depending on the age of the permit trading program
among other factors. Gangadharan (2000) estimates transactions costs reduced the likelihood of a permit trade in the Los
Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentives Market by 32% in 1995 and 12% in 1996. Kerr and Maré (1998) estimate transac-
tions costs in the US Lead Phasedown program account for between 10-20% of potential trade surplus. Similar ndings
are reported by Jarait·e and Kuµzukauskas, 2012. Estimate of transactions costs associated with the Clean Development
Mechanism are considered to be large (Michaelowa et al., 2003).
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We contrast production and emission outcomes under both xed and proportional transactions
costs. We derive equilibrium factor employment, potential and actual production of the good output,
the emissions, and permit prices under the two forms for trading costs. We introduce two metrics,
capacity utilization and permit utilization, for evaluating ine¢ ciencies generated by trading costs. The
former is dened as the ratio of actual output produced to full capacity output, and the latter is the
ratio of permits utilized relative to the cap issued by the regulator. The key results are summarized by
two propositions.
Under proportional costs, rmsinput employment and aggregate potential output (capacity) depend
on the sum of a buyers and a sellers per permit trading costs (henceforth, total costs) and not on the
buyers and the sellers share of these costs. As long as the total cost falls below a threshold, the
equilibrium is e¢ cient: production capacity as well as emission permits are fully utilized as under
costless trade. The explanation is the following. For the production-emission outcome under trading
costs to match that under costless trade, two conditions have to be met: (1) an ex ante optimal factor
employment condition that roughly requires expected marginal permit cost to match the permit price
under costless trade, and (2) an ex post participation constraint that requires that both buyers and
sellers participate in the permit market. Condition (1) roughly demands that the mean of the buyers
and sellersopportunity cost of emissions, i.e., the buyersper permit expenditure and the sellersper
permit sales income, equal the permit price under costless trade. Condition (2) places an upper bound
on a buyers expenditure to ensure non-negative surplus from a permit purchase, and a oor of zero on
a sellers income from a permit sale. Finally, by placing a wedge between what a buyer pays and what
a seller receives for a permit, trading costs engender a third condition: (3) For each permit trade, the
buyersexpenditure and the sellersincome di¤er precisely by the total trading costs - an accounting
identity that must hold.
If one of the participation constraints in (2) binds, (1) and (3) can not hold simultaneously for
all values of trading costs. To see this, suppose (1) holds and the equilibrium is e¢ cient. Then the
participation constraint in (2) along with condition (1) determine per permit buyersexpenditure and
sellers income, which in turn uniquely determine the total trading cost threshold that satises (3).
This cost threshold is non-monotonic in emissions cap: it rst rises with the cap and then falls. To
understand this, consider rst a su¢ ciently small emission cap such that the permit price under costless
trade is near the upper bound of the expenditure a permit buyer is willing to incur. With trading costs,
a relatively small cap induces rms to ex ante overemploy factors as in the absence of permit trade.
Ex post, there is an excess demand for permits raising its price such that the buyersexpenditure hits
its upper bound, i.e, the participation constraint binds. Now (1) can only be satised if a buyers per
permit expenditure and a sellers per permit income, both, are su¢ ciently close to the permit price
under costless trade. That is, their di¤erence (i.e., total trading cost) is su¢ ciently small. Conversely,
consider a su¢ ciently large cap such that the permit price under costless trade is close to zero. In
equilibrium, permits are in excess supply and sellersparticipation constraints bind. Now satisfying
condition (1) requires that buyersexpenditure and sellersincome, per permit, be close to zero, thus
setting the total cost threshold also close to zero. Finally, with an intermediate emission cap the permit
price under costless trade is su¢ ciently far from the participation bounds in (2), which gives enough
room for a buyers per permit expenditure and a sellers per permit income to di¤er substantially before
one of the participation constraints in (2) triggers. As a result, the cost thresholds are relatively higher.
For any emission cap if the total cost lies below the threshold, either buyersper permit expenditure
has to decline or sellers per permit income has to rise in a manner that the binding participation
constraint in (2) becomes slack. Now (1) and (3) hold simultaneously and the equilibrium is e¢ cient.
On the other hand, if the total cost is above the threshold, the participation constraint continues to
bind, but (1) can no longer hold. Some trade, however, always occurs as long as the total trading cost
remains below the market value of goods produced due to the marginal permit. Consider a relatively
small cap with total cost above the threshold but below the market surplus due to an additional permit
use. There is an excess demand for permits and the buyersparticipation constraints bind. All emission
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permits are utilized but some rms end up with an idle production capacity. Conversely, with large
emission caps there is an excess supply of permits and the sellersparticipation constraints bind. Now
all rms utilize their full production capacity though some permits remain unutilized.
Fixed trading costs preclude full utilization of either production capacity or permits because some
emission-constrained rms with idle production capacity and some rms with unutilized permits opti-
mally choose not to enter the permit market. The second proposition in the paper formally establishes a
joint (two-dimensional) upper bound on buyersand sellerstrading costs that separate cap-dependent
production-emission equilibria with and without trade. Here, both buyersand sellerscosts matter for
trade. If the emission cap is relatively small, the amount of unutilized permits are low and a small xed
trading cost discourages sellers from entering the permit market, even if buyers are willing to forfeit
their entire surplus to buy a permit. The opposite is the case when the cap is relatively large: few rms
have ex post excess production capacity and even with small trading costs they prefer not to enter the
market even when the permits are o¤ered for free. Under the assumption that sellersand buyerscosts
are equal, the two-dimensional upper bound on xed costs converges to a unidimensional upper bound,
as under proportional costs, and a non-monotonic relationship between emission caps and the common
trading cost reappears: When the emission caps are set either relatively low or high even small costs
preclude trade, whereas for the intermediate values of caps, the cost bounds are higher.
Under both types of trading costs, there is an excess demand for permits and some production
capacity remains idle for relatively low emission caps. In such cases, capacity utilization is increasing in
the cap. Conversely, with relatively high emission caps, there is an excess supply of permits and some
permits are wasted. The higher the cap, the lower is the permit utilization. For any cap, the permit
demand-supply gap widens with an increase in productivity shocks. However, the capacity/permit
utilization response to the variance of shocks is opposite under the two cost specications. Under
proportional costs all rms participate in the permit market and an increase in productivity variance
aggravates the utilization problem by widening the demand-supply gap. Under xed costs, a rise in
the output variance increases the mass of rms with an excess demand and/or supply who now nd it
optimal to enter the permit market. A higher output uncertainty now alleviates the utilization problem.
Earlier literature has examined the impact of transactions costs on the performance of cap-and-trade
environmental regulations.4 In a model of decentralized cap-and-trade emissions regulation, Mont-
gomery (1972) showed that with frictionless permit trading an aggregate abatement target can be
achieved at minimum cost, and that the abatement outcome is independent of the initial distribution of
pollution rights. Stavins (1995) studied the cost e¢ ciency of transactions costs in a setting where rms
employ a convex abatement technology and are initially heterogeneous in terms of emissions permits
holdings and/or abatement demand. Stavins (1995) showed, in a partial equilibrium framework, that
cost-e¢ cient abatement outcomes do not emerge in the presence of non-linear transactions costs.5
These authors and others in the cap-and-trade literature have studied pollution abatement and emis-
sion reduction by employing an increasing and convex cost-of-abatement function. In this framework,
the input and output choices of rms are assumed independent of emissions abatement decisions (see
Färe et. al., 2013 for an exception). Most papers adopting this approach also assume a social objective
of minimizing the cost of meeting a given emissions target (e.g., Montgomery, 1972; Stavins, 1995;
Zhao, 2003). Reigning wisdom holds that transaction costs, generally, act as a wedge between marginal
abatement costs and benets and thereby preclude e¢ cient abatement.
Our work departs from earlier literature in two important ways. We derive permit prices, factor
allocations, industrial output and emissions under permit market transactions costs in a general equi-
librium model. We track the transactions cost wedge through buyer and seller interactions, equilibrium
permit prices, and its e¤ect on the ex ante factor allocation decisions of rms. We show that reigning
4See Krutilla and Krause (2010) for a review.
5Montero (1997) extends Stavins (1995) analysis by introducing uncertainty in approval of permit trades by the
regulator. This essentially adds another layer of transactions costs. The analytical results of this paper however rely on
an exogenous permit price.
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wisdom does not always hold, particularly when transactions costs are proportional and not too large.
Second, our model features joint production of a good and an environmentally bad output.6 We focus
explicitly on the link between emission regulations and rmsproduction and investment plans and, as
a consequence, derive industry-specic metrics for evaluating permit program performance in various
trading environments.
Our assumption of irreversibility of factor inputs is akin to Zhao (2003), who shows uncertainty
in abatement costs discourage investment under xed emission charges relatively more than under cap
and trade. In our model, the irreversible factor proxies for a rms installed capital and/or long-term
labor contracts. A setting in which our model ts well is energy intensive industries operating under
cap-and-trade CO2 emissions allowance regulation, although the model applies broadly across polluting
industries.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our basic production and emission model
in the next section, which also lays out the costless trade and no-trade equilibrium as the two limiting
benchmarks. The following two sections analyze the models equilibrium with proportional and xed
trading costs, sequentially. Concluding remarks are o¤ered in Section 5. An appendix, Section 7,
provides all algebraic proofs while extensions of the benchmark model are discussed in Section 8
2 Model
There is a consumer good with price p; produced by a unit mass of ex ante identical rms indexed
by i 2 [0; 1]. A common production technology denoted by y (n; ") is used by all rms, where n
denotes the quantity employed of a composite factor with its purchase price w, and " is a rm-specic
idiosyncratic productivity shock. Shocks are independently and identically distributed, with g(") and
G (") respectively denoting the pdf and cdf of " 2 "min; "max. We assume that y  0; yn  0, y" > 0;
ynn  0, and yn" > 0; y (0; ") = 0 8", limn!0 yn = 1; and limn!1 yn = 0, where subscripts denote
di¤erentiation with respect to the subscripted argument. Below we assume that n is chosen before
rm-specic " is realized and that n is irreversible. In equilibrium, all rms choose a common n. Let
ymin (n)  y  n; "min and ymax (n)  y (n; "max). Let yf (n)  E fy (n; ")g  R
"
y (n; ") g(") d". Note
that yf denotes the expected full-capacity output of a rm if it did not expect to face any further
production constraints. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model, yf also stands for the
aggregate output under full capacity utilization. Whenever obvious, we use yf , ymin, and ymax below
without n as an explicit argument.
It is assumed that producing y units of goods generates z (y) units of a pollutant as a by-product.8
Regulations require a rm i to cap its emission up to its holding of emission permits. The emissions are
monitored and perfectly enforced. Let eR denote the total amount of permits (the emission cap) issued
by the regulator. If rm i holds ei units of emission permits at the time of production, its emissions
must follow zi  z  yi  ei. We assume that zy > 0. Empirical evidence that can guide the sign of zyy
is not available, and henceforth for analytical convenience we assume that z (y) = y. A rm i with
factor employment n and shock "i can produce at its full capacity up to y
 
n; "i

. Actual output yi
6Our approach to modeling pollution technology as joint production of a consumer good and an environmentally
bad output follows Fare, Grosskopf, Noh, and Weber (2005), Murty et al. (2012) and others. We assume weak output
disposability in emissions, while maintaining strong output disposability in production of the consumption good.
7Cap-and-trade regulatory programs for CO2 emissions now exist in Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and
the United States. Canada, China and South Korea are in the process of developing their own programs. The European
Union Emissions Trading System covers 45% of total European Union emissions. Firms for which our model is particularly
applicable include power and heat generating rms, and rms in the energy-intensive sector (oil reneries, rms producing
steel and iron and other metals, ceramics, pulp, paper and chemicals).
8An alternative assumption could be that rms have a deterministic technology y (n) for consumer goods and shock
"i instead is specic to emissions: y units of output produced by a rm i generates z
 
"i; y

units of emissions. Appendix
7.3 shows that the two specications are equivalent.
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however may be constrained by its emission permits:9
yi  miny  n; "i ; ei=	 ; (1)
A production plan consists of two-stage ex ante and ex post decisions, before and after rms
productivity shock is realized. In the rst stage, that we think of as the planning stage, rms trade and
acquire emission permits ei0 in a pre-production market at per unit price , and employ n to maximize
expected prots. The productivity shock is realized at the production stage: after permits are purchased
and n is employed. At this stage, rms choose
 
ei; yi

: yi  ei	 depending on the permit market
environment. For example, with permit trade, rm i with y
 
n; "i

> ei0 can choose to purchase
additional emission permits from rm j with y
 
n; "j

< ej0. Thus, ei denotes the production-stage
permit holding of rm i. To di¤erentiate between planning and production stage permit prices, we
denote the latter by r.
Our assumption of irreversible inputs refers to a situation where rms build production capacity
through irreversible investments in capital and/or sign binding labor contracts. The associated invest-
ment and labor costs are sunk prior to the realization of productivity shocks.10 We assume throughout
that permit trading at the planning stage is frictionless. A few words of justication for this assump-
tion are warranted. First, planning stage permit adjustments are not motivated by the need to balance
unanticipated emissions with permit holdings. It is only after rms realize their potential productivity
shock that they adjust permit holdings to balance their actual emissions to their permitted level. The
latter motive for trade is the focus of our analysis. Second, since rms in our model are ex ante identi-
cal, there is no planning stage permit adjustment beyond the initial allocation of cap/permits from the
regulator.11
We assume that buyers and sellers of permits at the production stage must incur a cost of b and
s, respectively, that can be either a xed cost of entering the permit market, or proportional to the
quantity of permits traded. Under xed costs, buyers must pay b and sellers must pay s to engage in
permit trading, irrespective of the quantity traded. Under proportional costs, if the market permit price
is r, a seller receives r   s per unit traded, while a buyer pays r + b. In both cases, if b = s = 0,
trade is costless. If either of b or s is prohibitively large, no trade will occur, and rm i will produce
and market yi = min
n
y
 
n; "i

; e
i0

o
.
We are now ready to study equilibria under alternative trading environments. For concreteness, we
will also employ parametric examples and compute various quantities of interest, such as full capacity
and realized outputs, permits resold and unsold in the market along with the equilibrium permit prices
in the planning and the production stage. A unit mass assumption for rms, their ex ante similarity, and
an absence of aggregate uncertainty implies that rmsexpected outcomes at the planning stage coincide
with ex post aggregate outcomes. Let ya  R yidi denote the aggregate output produced by rms, where
yi follows (38). Then, aggregate emission za  R zidi = ya. Thus, ea  za denotes the aggregate
permits utilized. Two metrics are used to compare equilibria under various trading environments:
industry-wide capacity utilization which we express as ratio ya=yf and permit utilization, expressed as
ea=eR. We say an equilibrium is e¢ cient when ya=yf = ea=eR = 1.
It is useful to characterize three benchmark equilibria: (i) no regulation; (ii) regulation with costless
permit trade and; (iii) regulation without permit trade. A tilde (~) is placed over endogenous variables
n, ; yf ; ya; za, and ea to denote outcomes in the no regulation case. An asterisk () and hat symbol
(^) are used under the costless permit and no permit trade benchmarks, respectively.
9Our technology can be taken as a special case of more general specication o¤ered by Färe et al. (2005).
10An alternative characterization would allow a portion of the input n to be reversible, perhaps at a cost. The case of
input reversibility is discussed in Appendix 8.2.
11Alternatively, we can assume that rms have an identical initial allocation of emission permits at the planning stage
and simply abstract from permit trade at this stage. None of the results in the paper will change. The shadow price
of these permits then equals the market price under frictionless trade. Having a planning stage frictionless permit trade
essentially allows us to quantify the value of these permits for the regulator.
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Unregulated emissions Here, a rms expected prot is
E f (n)g = p yf (n)  w n;
which obtains ~n as a solution to
yfn (~n) =
w
p
: (2)
Thus, aggregate output ~ya = ~yf . Dene ~zmax  ymax (~n) as the maximum amount of emission caused
by any rm when emissions are unregulated. Then, if eR > ~zmax, no rm is emission constrained. Since
in practice regulations are restrictive, we assume eR < ~zmax in what follows. It is useful to note for
future that ~za = ~ya = ~yf is the equilibrium emissions in the absence of a regulation cap.
Costless permit trade Here, rmsoptimal input choice equalizes its marginal cost with its marginal
expected revenue (See Appendix 7.1):
w = (p  )
Z "max
"min
yn (n
; ") g(")d"; (3)
and in equilibrium
ya (n) = yf (n) =
eR

: (4)
The above two determine 
 
eR

and n
 
eR

. A comparison of (3) with (2) implies that if the regulator
sets eR = ~za,  = 0 and n = ~n. The aggregate outcome is the same as that in the absence of any
regulatory cap.12 However, if eR < ~za, n < ~n and  > 0: The assumption ynn < 0 implies that
d
deR
< 0 and the assumption limn!0 yn =1 further implies that as eR ! 0,  ! p ;  monotonically
maps (0; ~za) to

p
 ; 0

.
In the equilibrium given by (3) and (4), all rms begin with identical amount of permits, i.e.,
ei0 = eR for all i, and employ n : yf = e
R
 . After productivity shocks are realized those with
y
 
n; "i

> yf purchase more emission permits to fully utilize their production capacity, while those
with y
 
n; "i

< yf sell, and markets clear: ea =
R 1
0
zidi = eR: All excess permits are sold since  > 0;
also,  < p ensures all unused permits are purchased in equilibrium. As a result, full utilization occurs.
That is, y

yf
= e
a
eR
= 1 holds.
Consider a central planner who aims to produce yf = e
R
 . It is optimal for the planner to command
each rm to employ an equal input amount n, such that yf (n) = e
R
 , and then produce at full capacity
after rmsproductivity is realized. The decentralized outcome under perfectly competitive and costless
permit trade replicates the planners goal, and thus a version of the rst welfare theorem holds.13 This
notion of e¢ ciency breaks down in the absence of permit trade, which we discuss next.
Without permit trade The optimal input employment and planning stage permit price (in equilib-
rium) is given by (see Appendix 7.2)
^ =
p

 
1 G("R) ; (5a)
w = p
Z "R
"min
yn (n^; ") g(")d"; (5b)
12This is precisely due to the exchange (trade) of permits between rms whose potential emissions exceed their permit
holdings with those whose emissions fall below. In the absence of this exchange the aggregate output equals yf only when
eR  ~zmax as discussed earlier.
13See Proposition 5.F.1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
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where "R is dened by y
 
n^; "R
  eR . The above two equations determine n^  eR and ^  eR. Equation
(5a) implies that the marginal emission permit is chosen to equate its up-front cost with its expected
benet. A unit of emission permit allows the rm to market 1 units of output with a sale value of
p
 .
But the permit is used only if the rms full capacity emissions exceeds its permitted level, which occurs
with probability 1 G("R). The condition for the optimal input choice (5b) is standard; n is chosen to
equate the input price with its expected marginal value product.
Note that in general y^f 6= eR . Under costless trade, rms utilize their full capacity at the production
stage. In the absence of trade, a rm i can fully utilize its production capacity only if eR  z  n^; "i;
otherwise its output is constrained by yi = e
R
 . The aggregate production is
y^a =
Z "R
"min
y (n^; ") g(")d"+
eR

 
1 G  "R < y^f ;
The output lost due to unutilized capacity and the quantity of unutilized permits can be expressed as
y^f   y^a =
Z "max
"R

y (n^; ")  e
R


g(")d";
eR   e^a =
Z "R
"min
 
eR   y (n^; ") g(")d":
For analytical convenience, henceforth, we assume that y is separable in n and ".
Let f (n ; ") = f (n) + " or f (n; ") = "f (n)
Under this assumption, a result that is useful in the following is stated next.
Lemma 1 There exists eX < ~zmax such that
eR S eX () y^f T e
R

:
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
With no permit trade, each rm faces a cap eR at the production stage and can produce no more
than e
R
 . While the marginal cost of n is constant at w, on the benet side a marginal increase in
n has two mutually opposite e¤ects. Output rises for all ex post productivity realizations, which, in
the standard manner, would raise rmsrevenue. However, a marginal increase in n also triggers the
emission constraint to bind at a lower productivity, i.e., "R falls. This reduces the probability that
the marginal n will be utilized in production. The two marginal revenue e¤ects of n balance its cost
w when yf (n^) = e
X
 . When e
R < eX , at a relatively lower scale of production, n is relatively small:
its marginal product e¤ect dominates the reduced probability of utilization e¤ect, inducing a factor
over -employment such that y^f > e
R
 . The situation reverses for e
R > eX .
The optimal choice of n is increasing in eR, when eR ! ~zmax, y^f ! ~yf < eR , but for eR su¢ ciently
close to zero y^f > e
R
 since limn!0 yn = 1. By continuity there exists eX , which is unique when
y (n; ") = y (n) + " or = "y (n) : Irrespective of whether eR Q eX ; for some rms operating at full
capacity will violate their permissible emissions, while for others full capacity emissions are below the
permits they hold. As a result, both capacity and emission permit utilizations are below 100%: Suppose,
as a counterfactual, permit markets open unexpectedly at the operations stage when rms have already
employed n^. In this case, there would be an excess demand for permits when eR < eX and an excess
supply of permits for eR > eX . We show below that this market mismatch exists in equilibrium even
when the permit market is open at the operations stage but trade incurs transactions costs.
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At this point, It is worth noting that in all trading environments , r, n, yf , ea = ya are en-
dogenously determined as functions of model parameters p, w, technological specication y (:), ", and
the regulators cap eR. Our objective is to understand how transactions costs, in its alternate forms
and magnitudes impact permit trade, production plans, and marketable output over the entire range
of binding emission caps eR < ~zmax, where ~zmax follows from (2). Any alteration in fp; wg will only
re-scale the range of eR for our analysis and henceforth we keep w and p xed in the rest of the pa-
per.14 All endogenous quantities and prices are implicitly treated as functions of eR. We use eR as an
argument explicitly only when clarity demands.
3 Proportional trading costs
Under proportional trading costs, a rm in need of additional emission permits pays r + b per unit,
while a rm with surplus permits receives r   s per unit. Let T  b + s denote the total per unit
trading costs. Notice that for permits to be bought and sold in equilibrium, we must have r + b  p
and r   s  0, respectively. This implies b  p   r  p   s. Thus for trade to occur T  p : no
trade occurs when the goods market revenue from an extra permit is below total trading costs.
The expected prot of a rm employing n and initially holding e0 permits can be written as
E


 
n; e0
	
= p
Z "max
"min
y (n; ") g(")d"+ (r   s)
Z "0
"min
 
e0   y (n; ") g(")d"
   r + b Z "max
"0
 
y (n; ")  e0 g(")d"  e0   wn; (6)
where "0
 
n; e0

is determined from y
 
n; "0

= e0. The second and the third term above denote expected
revenue from permits sold and expected cost of permits purchased, respectively. In equilibrium with
"0 = "R, the optimal choice for n equates its marginal cost with its marginal benet:
w = pyfn  
 
(r   s)
Z "R
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"+
 
r + b
 Z "max
"R
yn (n; ") g(")d"
!
| {z }
EMEC(n)
: (7)
The rst term on the RHS is the expected marginal revenue from goodssales. The terms within
brackets represent the expected marginal emission cost of n (henceforth, EMEC(n)) due to pollution
regulation. The rst term relates to " realizations for which the rm has a permit surplus, i.e., it is a
seller. A marginal increase in n reduces revenues from permit sales at the rate of (r   s) yn (n; ") :
The second term captures " realizations for which the rm has a permit shortfall, i.e., it is a buyer. A
marginal increase in n now increases rmspermit costs at the rate of
 
r + b

yn (n; "). Thus, the
rst and the second components of EMEC(n) reect expected loss of revenue from permit sales and
expected increase in costs, respectively, due to the marginal increase in n.
The prot maximizing equilibrium choice for e0 dictates:
 =
 
r + b
  
1 G("R)+ (r   s)G  "R ; (8)
which equates the permits planning stage market value with its expected worth at the production stage:
A marginal permit is used against the rms emissions with probability 1   G("R); in which case it is
worth r+ b; with probability G
 
"R

the rm does not need it against its emissions, and sells it in the
market at r   s.
14One of them is irrelevant as it can easily be set as the numeraire.
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As of now, we have two optimality conditions (7) and (8) but three unknowns: , r and n. The
equilibrium is characterized by (7) and (8) holding at e0 = eR, and the market clearing conditions:
eR = ea and ya < yf if and only if r + b =
p

;
eR > ea and ya = yf if and only if r = s;
eR = ea and ya = yf if and only if s < r <
p

  b: (9)
The rst condition relates to cases when rmsfull capacity emissions exceed permits held in the
aggregate. Firms with relatively high productivity would want to buy additional permits as long as
r + b  p . There is an excess demand for permits in the aggregate at r + b < p that drives its
equilibrium market price all the way to r = p   b. The second relates to cases when outstanding
permits exceed full capacity emissions creating an excess supply at the production stage. In equilibrium
permit prices are driven down to just cover the sellerstrading cost. It is only in the third case that
both sellers and buyers obtain a positive surplus from trade and markets clear: Every rm produces at
full capacity and no permit is wasted.
Note that with b = s = 0 = T , we have r =  =  from (8) and (7), and the latter reduces
to (3). On the other hand, when b + s = T > p , permit trade ceases and instead of (6) a rms
expected prot becomes
E


 
n; e0
	
= p
Z "0
"min
y (n; ") g(")d"+
pe0

 
1 G  "0  e0   wn;
which yields the pre-production permit price and the optimal input choice as given by (5b) and (5a).
These two conditions also hold in the limit when T = p and trade occurs with the only possibility that
r = s and r+ b = p as can be veried by substituting in (7) and (8); these two equations along with
e0 = eR also determine the equilibrium for T  p . The following proposition characterizes equilibria
for all T 2
h
0; p
i
.
Proposition 2 There exists T
 
eR
 2 h0; p i, with T (0) = 0; T  eX = p ; T  eR = 0 for all
eR  ~za; and for all eR  ~za
@T
@eR
? 0 for eR 7 eX ;
such that (i) if T  T  eR ; n = n, ya = yf = eR for all eR; (ii) if T 2 (T ; p ];
eR S eX ()
8><>:
ya = e
R
 < y
f ;
ya = yf = e
R
 ;
ya = yf < e
R
 ;
and where n is determined from
w = T
Z "R
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d" for eR  eX ; (10a)
w = p yf (n)  T
Z "max
"R
yn (n; ") g(")d" for eR  eX : (10b)
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Proof. See Appendix 7.6.
Part (i) of the proposition states that the equilibrium is e¢ cient as long as the total per unit trading
cost falls below an upper bound T which varies with eR non-monotonically. This bound is su¢ ciently
small for both large and small values of eR. To understand this, note that for the equilibrium with
trading costs to be e¢ cient, r must induce the input choice n despite trading costs. Comparing the
RHS of (3) with the RHS of (7) requires that the EMEC(n) with trading costs must equal that under
costless trade for n = n. This can be rewritten as
 = (r   s) E fyn (n
js)g
E fyn (n)g +
 
r + b
 E fyn (njb)g
E fyn (n)g ; (11)
where Efyn(n
js)g
Efyn(n)g and
Efyn(njb)g
Efyn(n)g denote the fraction of expected marginal emission due to n; conditional
on the rm being a seller and a buyer, respectively. Thus, e¢ cient factor employment demands that
the average of the sellersand buyerspermit prices, weighted by their respective contributions to the
expected marginal emissions due to n, equal . Clearly, r is decreasing in b and increasing in s:
Intuitively, a higher b reduces permit demand and lowers its market price; a higher s hinders sales
and thereby requires the equilibrium permit price to rise. Finally, ex post, permit markets must clear
for the all emissions permits to be utilized, requiring r 2

s; p   b

.
Consider a value of eR that is slightly less than emissions under no regulatory constraints, ~za. Under
costless trade, the permit price  is then close to zero. Sellersex post participation constraint r  s
and rmsex ante e¢ cient factor employment condition, (11), are satised only if both s and b are
su¢ ciently small. Similarly, consider the case when eR ! 0 and thus  ! p . Once again, buyersex
post participation constraint r + b  p and (11) are satised only if both s and b are su¢ ciently
small. Thus, full e¢ ciency occurs under high and low emission caps if and only if T is su¢ ciently
small. Now, consider an intermediate value of eR, e.g. such that  = p2 . Such a cap allows a range of
r 2

0; p

and a corresponding T 2 [0; p ) such that both buyersand sellersparticipation constraints
are satised and (11) holds.
When T > p , there is no surplus from trade and the permit market ceases to exist. For example,
if buyersgains are zero, i.e., r + b = p , the sellersrevenue r   s = r + b   T < 0, and sellers
remain inactive; if sellers surplus r   s = 0, the buyers gain p  
 
r + b

= p   T < 0. The
equilibrium outcomes are the same as in the no trade benchmark derived earlier. Following Lemma 1,
either production capacity or permits remain underutilized depending on whether eR ? eX . We next
consider both cases to explain how the aggregate output-permit mismatch prevails under T 2

T ; p

.
3.0.1 eR < eX
Equation (11) can be rewritten as
 = r + b| {z }
 p
  T E fyn (n
js)g
E fyn (n)g ; (12)
which, for a given b < p ; places an upper bound on 
T for ensuring that buyers participate: r+ b 
p
 :When 
T = T , r + b = p , and (12) continues to hold. For 
T > T , r = p   b; (12) ceases to
hold and n 6= n is determined by part (ii) of Proposition 2. Recalling from Lemma 1 that for T = p ,
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yf = y^f > e
R
 = y
f, we have yf 2  yf; y^f for T 2 T ; p. There is an excess demand for permits
and the participation condition for the buyers binds, i.e., r + b = p . Any increase in 
T essentially
lowers the sellersopportunity cost as r   s = p   T . Thus EMEC(n) decreases and equilibrium n
and yf are higher than n and yf.
The reason yf < y^f under costly trade is that a marginal unit of output obtains p    r + b = 0
for a rm i with y
 
n; "i

> e
R
 as in the absence of trade. However, if the rm realizes y
 
n; "i

< e
R
 ; it
can sell its excess permits at r s = p  T > 0 unlike in the absence of trade. This ex post asymmetry
no gains if excess capacity but positive earnings if excess permits induces rms to choose a relatively
lower output capacity under costly trade.
3.0.2 eR > eX
Now, (11) can be rewritten as
 = r   s| {z }
0
+ T
E fyn (njb)g
E fyn (n)g ; (13)
which places an upper bound of T on T for sellers to participate in the permit market, i.e., r s  0.
At T = T , r = s, and (13) continues to hold. For T > T , r = s, and (13) ceases to hold and n 6= n
is determined by part (ii) of Proposition 2. Now (from Lemma 1) with T = p , y
f = y^f < e
R
 = y
f.
Thus, for all T 2

T ; p

, yf 2  y^f ; yf. In equilibrium, there is an excess supply of permits and
the sellers participation condition binds, i.e., r = s. Any increase in T essentially increases the
buyers opportunity cost r + b = T . Thus EMEC(n) increases and the equilibrium n and yf are
lower than n and yf, causing an excess supply of permits by y
f yf
yf . As for y
f > y^f , a rm i gets
r s = 0 if y  n; "i < eR , whereas if y  n; "j > eR it can buy additional permits and get a net value
of p    r + b > 0. This encourages a larger factor employment relative to n^.
To sum up, e¢ ciency demands that ex post permit markets clear. Since all sellers of unused permits
receive the same marginal revenue, and all buyers receive an identical marginal benet, they are all
active in the permit market as long as these marginal values are positive. In the event of an excess
permit supply or demand, the short side of the market captures all the surplus from trade. Finally,
in case of an excess demand, i.e., when r + b = p ; some permit-constrained rms are unable to fully
utilize their production capacity.
For a concrete illustration, we parameterize the model and derive the thresholds stated in Proposition
1.
3.1 Parametric examples
Below, both specications, y (n ; ") = y (n) + " and y (n; ") = "y (n) ; are discussed sequentially. Under
the rst specication we assume that " is uniformly distributed. This allows simple closed form solu-
tions of endogenous quantities and prices as functions of targeted emissions and trading costs (both
proportional and xed). However, the results may have a limited scope because (i) the output variance
is exogenously xed and is invariant to the production scale, (ii) the shock distribution is restricted
to be nite. To address these limitations, we assume " to be log-normally distributed for the second
specication. We show that with proportional trading costs the results are qualitatively similar under
both specications, whereas with xed trading costs the results diverge (Section 4).
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Figure 1: Full, partial and no trade outcomes: trading costs and emissions caps.
3.1.1 Additive, uniformly distributed shock
Let y (n ; ") =
p
n + "; with "  U [ c; c].15 The cost thresholds stated in Proposition 2 are (see
Appendix 7.7 for the details)
T
 
eR
 
8><>:
4eRw
2 for e
R < eX =  p4w
2p
   4e
Rw
2 for e
R 2  p4w ;  p2w 
0 for eR >  p2w = ~z
a
(14)
Figure 1 below exhibits T
 
eR

in the two dimensional space of eR and T . No trade occurs if T > p
for any value of eR. For T 2

T ; p

, permit trade occurs with excess demand when eR < eX , and
with excess supply when eR > eX . In the former, r = p   b. In the latter, r = s: Within the
boundaries of the triangle, the production-emission outcome is replicates that under costless trade.
As stated in Proposition 2, it is easily checked for all values of eR that both ex ante e¢ ciency and
ex post market participation conditions hold when T  T , and ya = yf = eR (see Appendix 7.7):
For T > T , there are two cases to consider.
3.1.2 eR < eX =  p4w ;
T > T = 4e
Rw
2
As stated in Proposition 2 e
a
eR
= 1. On the other hand, the production capacity utilization can be
expressed as
ya
yf
= 1  c
eR + c

1  
T
T

;
As intuition suggests, capacity utilization is decreasing in c and T . As eR increases, the demand-supply
mismatch in the permit market narrows, and capacity utilization improves. In the limit, eR ! eX , we
have 100% capacity utilization (ya = yf ).
15To ensure that y (n ; "min) > 0 requires restrictions on c. See Appendix 7.7.
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3.1.3 eR > eX =  p4w ;
T > T = 2p   4e
Rw
2
Now, following Proposition 2 y
a
yf
= 1. However, the permit utilization ratio can be expressed as
ea
eR
= 1  c
eR
1  T
T
1 + 4wc
T
:
Permit utilization is decreasing in T and c: It is also decreasing in eR. In this case, the demand-supply
gap narrows as eR approaches eX ; as eR  ! eX , permit utilization is 100%.
3.1.4 Multiplicative, log-normally distributed shock
We let y (n; ") = " n0:5 where ln " ~ N (0; ). This implies ~ya = ~yf = yf (~n) =
p
~n exp
 
1
2
2

=
p
2w exp
 
2

= ~z
a
 . Appendix 7.8 shows that
eX =
 p
2w
exp
 
2



 1
2


;
where  denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. Applying proposition 2 equations (10a) and
(10b), we have (see Appendix 7.8)
T
 
eR
 
8>>><>>>:
2w exp( 2)
[  12]
eR
 for e
R  eX
p 2w exp( 2) eR
[ 12]
for eR 2 eX ; ~za
0 for eR  ~za
Figure 1, as in the previous example, exhibits these thresholds. Once again, it is easily checked for all
values of eR (see Appendix 7.8) that both ex ante e¢ ciency and ex post participation conditions hold
when T  T , and ya = yf = eR : For T > T , the two cases are
eR < eX Although a closed form expression for capacity utilization can not be obtained, y
a
yf
follows
from
ya
yf


1

log

ya
yf

  1
2


=
2eR
w2T
exp
 2 :
Thus, capacity utilization is decreasing in  and T . As eR increases, the demand-supply mismatch in
the permit market narrows, and capacity utilization improves. In the limit, eR ! eX , we have ya = yf .
eR > eX Permit utilization e
a
eR
follows from
ea
eR
1  Tp
 
1     1 log  eaeR   12 =
p
2weR
exp

2

:
The LHS is increasing in e
a
eR
and T ; the RHS is decreasing in eR. Thus, permit utilization e
a
eR
decreases
with T as well as eR. Once again, as eR ! eX , ea ! eX . The variation of ea
eR
with  can not be
analytically signed. When checked numerically, it is decreasing in .
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Figure 2: Productivity shock thresholds and trade activity under xed costs.
4 Fixed trading costs
This section assumes trading in emission permits entails a xed (quantity invariant) market entry cost
of b and s for buyers and sellers, respectively. The expected prot of a rm that acquires permits e0
and employs input n is
E


 
n; e0
	
=
Z "
"min

py (n; ") + r
 
e0   y (n; ")	 g(")d"+ p Z "0
"
y (n; ") g(")d" (15)
+p
e0

Z "
"0
g(")d"+
Z "max
"

py (n; ") + r
 
y (n; ")  e0	 g(")d"
 sG (") + b (1 G ("))  e0   wn; (16)
where " and " are obtained from
r
0B@e0

  y (n; ")| {z }
y
1CA = s; (17a)
(p  r)
0B@y (n;")| {z }
y
  e
0

1CA = b: (17b)
Thresholds, " and " depend on the rms permit holding e0 and factor allocation n, choices that are
examined shortly.
Equation (16) is easily understood with the help of Figure 2. The four integrals decompose expected
prots into potential output realizations in the intervals,

ymin; y

,
h
y; e
0

i
;
h
e0
 ; y
i
, and [y; ymax]. The
rst two capture the cases of a rmspotential emissions falling below its permit holdings, z (y (n; ")) <
e0. The rst integral in (16) is the net expected return when productivity is very low and y 2 ymin; y
is realized. In this case, the rm will enter the permit market and sell excess permits e0 z. The second
integral states that rms with emission between y and e0 will not sell excess permits because the
sale earns less than the market entry cost. The third and the fourth integrals represent high potential
output realizations. A rm realizing a modestly high output between e
0
 and y will not buy additional
permits because the gains from trade are less than the market entry cost. Only if y exceeds y, will
the net revenues from purchasing additional permits o¤set the entry cost. The rst two terms in the
third line of (16) represent expected trading costs. Put simply, permit trades occur only if the gains are
su¢ ciently large to o¤set xed costs. For future reference, we term rms with y 2 ymin; y[ [y; ymax] as
active and those with y 2 y; y as inactive in the permit market.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the optimal choice of n in equilibrium with e0 = eR is
given by
w = (p  r)
Z
" 62[";"]
yn (n; ") g(")d"+ p
Z "R
"
yn (n; ") g(")d": (18)
The rst term on the RHS represents the expected revenue from marginal n, conditional on the rm
being active in the permit market. For shocks in this range, the market value of a unit of output is
15
p r. The second RHS term represents expected marginal revenue conditional on emissions lying below
permit holdings but above the threshold that warrants entry to the permit market. Here, producing
goods has a market value of p but no opportunity costs.16
The necessary condition for the optimal choice of e0, in equilibrium
 
e0 = eR

, gives
 =
p


G(") G("R)+ r [1 G(") +G(")] : (19)
The probability that the emission cap binds and permits are utilized at the margin is

G(") G("R);
the probability that the rm is active in the permit market and either buys or sells permits at r is
1 G(") +G("). Thus, the RHS represents expected value from a marginal permit.
Thus far, we have two equations, (18) relating optimal n to input and output prices, and (19) relating
 to r. One remaining is the permit market clearing condition:Z "
"min
 
eR   y (n; ") g(") d" = Z "max
"
 
y (n; ")  eR g(") d": (20)
Thus, , r and n are jointly determined by (18) - (20). It is easily seen that as b (s) increases,
the mass of rms with potentially high (low) emissions that buy (sell) in the permit market shrinks.
If either of these costs become su¢ ciently large, the permit market ceases to function.17 In this case,
" 62 [";"] = ?, the rst term in (18) vanishes and " = "min in the second term. The necessary conditions
expressed by (18) and (19) then reduce to (5b) and (5a). On the contrary, if s = b = 0,  = r and
equation (18) reduces to (3).
Once again, with the two cost bounds described above, we now present our general results.
Proposition 3 For all eR  ~zmax, dene
b
 
eR
  py  n^  eR ; "max  eR


;
s
 
eR
  peR

  y  n^  eR ; "min :
Then for each eR < ~zmax a permit market with the equilibrium price r 2

0; p

exists if and only if
b
b (eR)
+
s
s (eR)
< 1: (21)
Proof. See Appendix 7.9.
When b > b, no rm enters the permit market as a buyer even when sellers face no trading costs
and are willing to sell their surplus permits for free. The reverse is the case when s > s. Now even
when buyers face no xed costs and are willing to pay p per permit, the rm with the highest unused
(excess) permits does not break even by selling them. Condition (21) ensures that there is some surplus
from trade for some sellers and/or buyers, by requiring that when either sellersor buyerscosts are
high their counterpartscosts be o¤settingly low. If this condition holds, the equilibrium price adjusts,
r 2

0; p

, and market clears. In this case, permits sold by the rms with y 2
h
ymin; 1
 
eR   sr
i
equal those bought by rms with y 2
h
eR
 +
b
p r ; y
max
i
and (20) holds.
16Recall that when potential output lies between y
 
n; "R

and y (n;"), the rm does not break even in purchasing
additional emission permits. A marginal unit of potential output is simply lost.
17The argument is clearly valid for a nite support of the productivity distribution. If instead the support is innite, a
su¢ ciently large s will drive out all permit sellers from the market.
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Under xed costs, permit price equilibrates the demand from active sellers with supply from active
buyers by altering the extensive margin. When r ! s=
eR
  ymin
> 0, the mass of active sellers vanishes,
while as r ! p   
b=
ymax  eR
> 0, the mass of active buyers vanishes. As a result, r adjusts to equilibrate
the two. Yet, rms with y 2
h
y; e
R

i
have excess permits and rms with y 2
h
eR
 ; y
i
have unutilized
production capacity. As a result, neither the production capacity nor the emission permits is fully
utilized:
yf   ya =
Z "
"R

y (n; ")  e
R


g(")d" > 0; (22a)
eR   ea =
Z "R
"
 
eR   y (n; ") g(")d" > 0: (22b)
It is instructive to contrast this result with that under proportional costs. Recall that when propor-
tional trading costs are su¢ ciently small, all rms strictly benet by trading in the permit market and
both permit and production capacity is fully utilized. When T is su¢ ciently large (but < p ), trade
occurs with either excess permit demand or supply. Trade ceases only when T > p . Also, capacity
utilization is less than 100% only when eR < eX , and T is su¢ ciently high. In contrast under xed
costs, even when permits are traded, both capacity and permit utilizations are less than 100%.
It is easily checked that limeR!0 s
 
eR

= 0 and limeR!~zmax s
 
eR

> 0; limeR!0 b
 
eR

> 0 and
limeR!~zmax b
 
eR

= 0. Since y satises Inada conditions, e
R
 lies in the lower tail of the equilibrium
output distribution when eR is su¢ ciently low. There are many potential buyers but few sellers and
even a small s drives sellers out of the market. Conversely, a su¢ ciently high eR may lie in the upper
tail of output distribution in equilibrium. Then, there are many potential sellers and few buyers and
even a small b drives out buyers. This leads one to conjecture that b is decreasing whereas s is
increasing in eR.
The empirical transactions costs literature does not inform us to take a stand on whether b ? s.
For analytical convenience in what follows we therefore often assume b = s = . Then,  proxies
for total per trade transactions costs and allows us to contrast cost thresholds under xed vis à vis
proportional costs.18 Under proportional costs, emission permits are either in excess demand or supply
for all T 2

T ; p

, and whether e
R
 7 yf depends uniquely on whether eR 7 eX (see Proposition
2). Under xed costs, however, this result only holds with b = s and when " is symmetric around its
mean.
We illustrate the above results more concretely by extending our parametric examples studied in
section 3.
4.1 Parametric examples
We continue with the specications studied under proportional costs in Section 3.1.1.
4.1.1 Additive, uniformly distributed shock
The xed cost bounds dened in Proposition 3 are (see Appendix 7.10):
b = 2pc
~zmax   eR
~zmax + c
; s = 2pc
eR + c
~zmax + c
:
18With uniform distribution the mass of sellers equals that of buyers. Thus, each transaction can be thought of entailing
a total cost of 2.
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Figure 3: Trade outcomes under xed trading costs.
When eR is higher, the proportion of rms that have excess capacity is smaller and, therefore, a lower
threshold discourages sellers from entering the permit market. The opposite is the case for sellers: A
higher eR increases the number of excess permits held by sellers, and thus allows them to break even at
a higher trading cost. It is not possible to obtain a closed form solution for n and r in terms of model
parameters. They are jointly determined from (18), (19), and (20):
p
n =
p  r
2w
  
b   s
2c
=
eR

+
1
4c
"
b
p  r
2
 

s
r
2#
(23)
Evidently, unlike under proportional costs, where the equilibrium potential output depends only on
T , the equilibrium now depends on both b and s. For b 6= ks, eR 7 yf 6) eR 7 eX = p4w in
general (unlike Proposition 2 under proportional costs). For example, let b = 2s. Let eR = eX ;
then b = s = pc. Appendix 7.11 shows that yf 6= eX for eR = eX for any s < pc3 . On the other
hand, if s  pc3 ; condition (21) stated in Proposition 3 does not hold and there is no permit trade in
equilibrium.
Henceforth, we assume b = s = . Now (21) in Proposition 3 can be expressed as
 <   
bs
b + s
=
pc
2
"
1 

eR   eX
eX + c
2#
: (24)
To facilitate a contrast with a similar result under proportional costs (see Figure 1), the relationship
expressed in (24) is exhibited below in Figure 3.
Following (24),  reaches its maximum of pc2 at e
R = eX and monotonically declines on either side.
However, in contrast with Figure 1, trade is only partial in the region below the cost threshold since
some potential buyers and sellers prefer to remain inactive. Also, due to xed costs, the threshold
intersects with the x axis at ~zmax = 
 
p
2w + c

instead of ~za = p2w . The upshot is that even small
transactions costs are detrimental to trade when the emission cap is either small or large. Once again,
when the cap is small, there are few potential sellers, and a small trading cost drives them out of the
market. When the cap is large, the same logic holds for a small number of buyers.
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As is standard, n and r exhibit an inverse relationship at the planning stage as expressed by the
rst equation in (23)). However, in the permit market at the production stage, a higher n induces a
higher demand for permits. Thus, as evident from the second part of (23); r is increasing in n. Thus,
both yf (n) and r are uniquely determined as functions of eR. It is easily checked that @y
f
@eR
> 0 and
@r
@eR
< 0. In general, yf and r not only depend on eR, but also on  and c. However, when eR = eX ,
r = p and y
f = e
R
 is independent of  and c: Once again
19
yf T e
R

, eR Q eX :
This result is identical to those in the absence of trade (see Lemma 1) and under proportional costs
(see Proposition 1). But, as shown earlier, this does not generally hold with xed trading costs.20
Although a common underlying economic argument that the optimal choice of n equates its upfront
marginal cost with its expected marginal benets underlies the result as well, it is yet instructive to
understand this result since it involves a novel extensive margin, i.e., the mass of active and inactive
traders, that has not been encountered earlier. First, it is easy to check that eR = eX = p4w , i.e.,
r = p2 and y
f =
p
n = p4w satises (23). Here, a marginal increase in n increases potential output by
yfn =
1
2
p
n
= 2wp . The expected marginal revenue however depends on the distribution of active/inactive
rms in the permit market as shown in Figure 4(a). With a probability 12  pc , a rm has excess permits
and is active in the market: its marginal revenue is (p  r) yn = w; with probability pc the rm is
inactive and the marginal revenue is p yn = 2 w. With probability pc the rm has an excess capacity
but lacks matching emission permits: the marginal revenue is 0; with probability 12   pc the rm fully
utilizes its capacity by purchasing additional permits: the marginal revenue is (p  r) yn = w. Thus,
the expected marginal revenue is 2

1
2   pc

w + pc2w = w, thus precisely matching the input cost.
Hence,
p
n = p4w is indeed optimal when e
R =  p4w . Continuing this argument, it can be checked that
the expected marginal revenue exceeds w for a rm that sets
p
n  eR when eR < p4w or sets
p
n  eR
when eR > p4w .
Equations (23) imply that equilibrium depends on 
2
4c jointly. When trading costs are proportional,
every permit buyer and seller faces the same marginal returns from trade, whereas xed costs a¤ect the
extensive margin, i.e., the mass of active traders. This mass depends on the trading costs relative to
rmsheterogeneity (productivity spread). Dene {  24c as the e¤ective trading cost. Then,
eR 7 eX ) @y
f
@{
? 0
That yf may be increasing in trading costs is counterintuitive. However, this happens when eR < eX
and therefore r > p2 . The potential output distribution of rms active/inactive in the permit market
is shown above in Figure 4(b). Evidently, higher trading costs drive out buyers relatively more than
the sellers. The permit price must decrease in equilibrium. This induces rms to increase their ex ante
input employment. The opposite is the case when eR > eX .
Finally, capacity and permit utilizations can be expressed as
ya
yf
= 1  
2
2c
w
(p  r)3 < 1;
ea
eR
= 1  
2
4c

eR

1
r
2
< 1;
19Recall that under proportional costs the following holds more generally, irrespective of (i) whether shocks are additive
or multiplicative, (ii) the distribution of productivity shocks, and (iii) the relative magnitudes of buyers and sellers
trading costs.
20 It only holds for the special case of b = s and a uniform distribution for ". The two assumptions togther by o¤ering
a symmetry around yf = e
R

, eR = eX make this result possible.
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Figure 4: Trading activity under xed trading costs.
where the rst inequality utilizes r 2

0; p

. Neither production capacity nor permits are fully utilized
in contrast with proportional costs where at least one of them is fully utilized. When eR = eX , the
mass of inactive rms with excess capacity and with excess permits are identical and the above two
expressions reduce to
ya
yf
=
ea
eR
= 1  4w
p3
2
c
Both utilizations reduce with the e¤ective trading cost {.21 Finally,
eR 7 eX ) y
a
yf
7 e
a
eR
:
This follows from the fact that at su¢ ciently low emission caps rms over-employ n relative to permitted
emissions, whereas rms under-employ n when the cap is su¢ ciently high.
4.1.2 Multiplicative, log-normally distributed shocks
From Proposition 2, b =1 for all eR 2 (0; ~zmax) and s = p eR. For all nite b, (21) reduces to
s <
p

eR:
Under this specication, there are always some rms willing to purchase permits for any nite trading
costs. It is the mass of active sellers that may vanish as s gets larger. Thus, some trade always occurs
as long as the preceding inequality is satised. Note also that s is linearly increasing in eR.22
Even when b = s = , yf 6= eR for eR = eX (see Appendix 7.12) unlike with additive and
uniform ". Under proportional costs, when eR = eX , the equilibrium quantity of permits demanded
21The result holds even when eR 6= eX .
22Both b and s will be nite if the support for " is nite. For example, if " 2 U [1  ; 1 + ], with  < 1, it is easily
checked that b is nite and decreasing in eR.
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equals the quantity supplied, exactly as in costless trade, as long as T < p . The shape of rms
productivity distribution is irrelevant. However, since xed costs a¤ect the extensive margin, the shape
of the distribution along with  determines the prices and quantity traded in the permit market. Since
log "  N 0; 2 is asymmetric around the mean, eR = eX does not lead to an ex ante choice of
yf (n) = e
R
 .
23
In the alternative specication with y (n; ") = y (n) + ", the equilibrium and the utilization rates
depend solely on 
2
 .
24 The results however focus on the cases where  < . Clearly, for a given
, an increase in  improves utilization ratios. However, when  > , it is worth noting that in the
absence of trade, an increase in  would instead worsen utilization ratios. With y (n; ") = "y (n) and
log "~N

0; 2

, a sharply peaked distribution of full capacity outputs may imply that very little trade
occurs for a su¢ ciently large  even when  < s = p e
R. In this case, an increase in  may lead to
a decrease in utilization ratios. Figure 5 exhibits capacity utilization for eR = 1, 1:2; and 1:4, with
 = 0:5 and  = 1, p = 5; and w = 1. The capacity utilization rst declines (since it is practically under
a no trade regime) and then improves as an increasing  diminishes the trade-impeding e¤ect of .
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eR 1
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0.955
0.960
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0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
CU
Capacity utilization (CU) vis--vis the variance of output shocks.
Notice that capacity utilization improves with a higher emission cap. However, as under additive
uniform shocks, permit utilization decreases with eR. Figure 6 shows how permit utilization ips around
eR = eX . Here we assume  = 0:1 along with the parameter values mentioned earlier. When eR = eX
then as under additive and uniform ", capacity and permit utilizations, although not exactly equal, are
23 It can be veried that when " is symmetric (which requires its support to be nite as well), the symmetry of results
around eR = eX are similar as under additive and uniform shocks. When " is asymmetric, then for all  <  there exists
another eX
0 6= eX such that yf (n) = eR

= e
X0

. However, now eX
0
depends also on .
24Note that  = cp
3
when f (n; ") = n+ " with "  U [ c; c] :
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almost identical. This is because the distribution of " for  = 0:1 is fairly symmetric around the mean.
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As expected, both permit and capacity utilizations decrease with . Both ratios converge to their no
trade levels as  becomes su¢ ciently large.
5 Conclusions
We study equilibrium production and capacity utilization in a model with random production and
emissions, and costly trade in emission permits. The equilibria critically depend on whether the marginal
trading costs are constant (proportional) or whether rms incur a xed cost of entering the permit
market. Trading costs impede permit trade relatively more when the emission cap is either su¢ ciently
low or su¢ ciently high. At these extremes, small xed costs may totally shut trade o¤ by driving either
buyers or sellers out of the permit market.
Under proportional costs, trade always occurs as long as total per unit trading costs are below
the total surplus, which is derived from added output revenue generated when rms utilize available
production capacity. There exists an emission cap-dependent threshold such that if the trading cost
lies below the threshold, emission caps and all rm output capacities are fully utilized. This bound is
non-monotonic, it rst increases with the emission cap and then decreases as the cap approaches a point
where it no longer binds. If trading cost lies above the threshold, emission permit trade is partial, i.e.,
there remains either an excess supply or an excess demand for permits. A similar non-monotonic cost
bound exists under xed trading costs if the output randomness has a nite support. If trading costs
lie above the bound there is no permit trade. If they lie below, trade occurs but is only partial. There
are always rms who are unable to sell their excess permits and others who end up with unutilized
production capacity.
Under both types of trading costs, rmscapacity utilization is increasing in the emission cap. With
proportional costs, capacity utilization is less than 100% only when the emission cap is su¢ ciently low
and trading costs are su¢ ciently high. On the other hand, under xed costs, some production capacity
remains idle for all levels of emission caps and trading costs. The bottomline is that proportional
trading costs cause permit excesses or shortages only if these costs are su¢ ciently high, whereas there
are always some rms with excess permits and some with permit shortage under xed costs.
The implications of trading costs  either xed or proportional - for rms production plans and
capacity utilization have not been addressed in the literature. This is the main novelty of our work.
22
To highlight the role that transactions costs play in impeding trade and e¢ cient equilibria, we have
presented a simple model of choice under uncertainty. Sans uncertainty, there is no role for trade
or trading frictions. The model, however, abstracts from aggregate uncertainty. We conjecture that
introducing aggregate uncertainty in the model will not change the qualitative nature of our results.
We also conjecture that corrective policies can be used that induce full capacity utilization and regain
e¢ cient production equilibria even in the absence of permit trade. This is left for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Equilibrium with costless permit trade
While acquiring input n and permits e0 at the planning stage, rms expect their prots to be:Z "max
"min
 
p y (n; ")  r  y (n; ")  e0 g(")d" = (p  r) yf (n) + r e0: (25)
The rms choice at the production stage is trivial: as long as p > r, a rm i with y
 
n; "i

> e0 will
buy the di¤erence as additional permits. On the other hand, every rm with y
 
n; "i

< e0 will sell
excess permits as long as r > 0. We will require the price in the permit market at the production stage
to be consistent with its forecasted value at the planning stage. At the planning stage, the rms prot
maximization problem is to choose e0 and n to maximize expected prot:
E


 
n; e0
	  (p  r) yf (n) + re0   wn  re0:
An equilibrium requires that r = . Suppose r > . Then a rm can buy all the permits at , and sell
it later at production stage with per unit prot of r . If r < , it is better for everyone to sell permits
in the rst stage and then buy back later, which in equilibrium is impossible since all rms are identical
ex ante. To implement r =  we assume that a forward market, potentially through intermediaries or a
centralized exchange, exists that credibly promises to buy and sell permits at the production stage at
the pre-production price.
By assumption yf (n) is strictly concave in n. Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
optimal choice of n is
yfn (n) 
dyf (n)
dn
=
w
p   ;
where we have used r = . This is stated as (3) in the main text. It follows from the strict concavity of
yf (:) that n is decreasing in . Since  < 0 is ruled out, n can, at most, equal ~n. Further, since n  0,
  p.
We have shown above that  2
h
0; p
i
. In particular if n is nite,  > 0 and rms utilize all permits
acquired at the planning stage, either for its own use or for resale; the latter, in turn, is in demand
from rms whose emission permits fall short of their potential output level of emissions. Further, n > 0
implies  < p and no rm wastes its production capacity. A rm i with productivity realization "i
readjusts its emission permits to ei = y
 
n; "i

, and therefore ei   ei0 denotes the amount of permits
it buys (sells, if negative) in the permit market. In the aggregate
R
eidi = eR, which obtains (4) in the
main text.
7.2 Equilibrium without permit trade
When permit trade is prohibitively costly, the choice problem at the production stage is trivial. The
rm can not exceed its permitted emissions: yi  y  n; "0 = e0 must hold. The rms rst stage choice
24
problem is
max
fn;e0g
(Z "0
"min
py (n; ") g (") d"+
Z "max
"0
p
e0

g (") d"  e0   wn
)
;
where the rst two terms summarize rms expected sales revenue. The optimal choices of n and e0
respectively obtain (5b) and (5a) in the main text.
7.3 Equilibrium with uncertain emission e¢ ciency
Here, we assume that a rm i employing n can produce up to y (n) consumer goods; but a unit of
output produced generates "i units of emissions. Thus,
yi (n) = min

y (n) ;
ei
"i

;
where ei is its permit holding. Then, rms with "iy (n) < e0 will have excess emission permits while
those with "iy (n) > e0 would like to acquire additional permits. A costless permit trade will yield an
equilibrium n and  given by
yn (n
) =
w
p  E f"g  ;
ya = yf =
eR
E f"g  :
The equilibrium f; ng is identical to that stated in (3) and (4) for y (n; ") = "y (n) and E f"g = 1.
In the absence of permit trade, rmsplanning problem is
max
fn;e0g
(Z "0
"min
py (n) g (") d"+
p

Z "max
"0
e0
"
g (") d"  e0   wn
)
;
where "0 = e
0
y(n) . In equilibrium ^ and n^ will be given by
^ =
p

Z "max
"R
" 1 g (") d";
w = pyn (n^)G
 
"R

;
Clearly, by re-scaling  and y; f^; n^g can be made identical to that given by (5a) and (5b). Total
production of consumer goods is
y^a = y (n)G
 
"R

+
eR

Z "max
"R
1
"
g (") d" < yf = y (n)
and the output lost due to partial capacity utilization is
y^f   y^a =
Z "max
"R

y (n^)  e
R

1
"

g (") d"
Thus, the results under this alternative specication are equivalent to that in the main text. It can be
veried that qualitatively the results will be similar to that in the main text under partial trade with
either proportional or xed trading costs.
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7.4 Equilibrium with reversible inputs
With reversible inputs, rms trade and acquire emission permits e0 in a pre-production market at per
unit price : After the permits are obtained, they draw their productivity. Without any emission cap,
their optimal input employment follows
pyn
 
n; "i

= w:
With emission caps, there are two possibilities. If permits can be traded, the optimal input employment
is given by
yn
 
n; "i

=
w
p   ; (26)
and in equilibrium:
ya =
Z
y (n; ") g (") d" =
eR

(27)
In the absence of trade, and assuming that the emission cap binds for all rms, input employment
follows
y
 
ni; "i

=
eR

and once again (53) holds. Allocations implied by (52) and (53) replicate the allocations of a planner
who only faces aggregate constraint ya = eR, whereas no-trade outcome implies a constraint on each
rm. Thus, the two outcomes are di¤erent producing the same output would utilize more inputs in
the absence of trade.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 1
We rst determine eX and show that it is unique. Let n^X  n^  eX. For y (n ; ") = y (n) + "
yn
 
n^X

G

eX

  y  n^X = w
p
and
eX

= y
 
n^X

+ E f"g
Substituting the second into the rst obtains n^X uniquely from
yn
 
n^X

=
w
pG [E f"g]
which in turn determines eX uniquely. For y (n; ") = "y (n)
yn
 
n^X

E

"j"  e
X
y (n^X)

=
w
p
: and
eX

= E f"g y  n^X
Here, n^X is uniquely determined from
yn
 
n^X

=
w
pE ["j"  E f"g]
Note that n^ (y (~n; "max)) = ~n and y^f (~n) =
R "max
"min
y (~n; ") g (") d" < y (~n; "max). Thus, as eR !
y (~n; "max) > eX , y^f ! ~yf < eR . Since e
X
 is unique, for all e
R < eX , y^f > e
R
 must hold:
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the yf = e
R
 equilibrium rst. Here r > 
s and r < p   b. Begin with b = s = 0. Here
ya = yf (n) = e
R
 determines n
, (7) and (8) imply  = r =  as determined from (3).
We verify below that as long as b, s, and b + s = T are su¢ ciently small, n continues to be
the optimal input choice and  and r are determined by (7) and (8). Below, we consider the two cases
with eR 7 eX .
7.6.1 eR < eX
Fix eR < eX . Note that T = p satises equation (10a), i.e.,
w = T
Z "R
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d";
with n = n^ and then from Lemma 1 y^f > e
R
 . It is easily shown from the above that
@n
@T
> 0, so if
yf > e
R
 for 
T 0 < p , y
f > e
R
 for all 
T 2
h
T
0
; p
i
. Now dene T as
w = T
Z "R
"min
yn
 
n
 
eR

; "

g(")d" = (p  )
Z "max
"min
yn
 
n
 
eR

; "

g(")d"
Clearly, there exists such a T 2

0; p

for all  2

0; p

. Thus for all T 2 (T ; p ]; yf > e
R
 , and for
T = T ; yf = e
R
 by denition. Continuity then implies that
yf >
eR

for all eR < eX and T 2 (T ; p

]
When T < T , equation (10a) no longer holds because it would then imply yf < eR. Also, since
T < p , equation (10b) can not hold simultaneously with (10a) when 
T = T . Therefore, yf = eR,
n = n, and  = r =  are given by (3).
Finally, it is easily checked that @
T
@eR
> 0.
7.6.2 eR > eX
Now, x eR > eX . Note that T = p satises
w = p
Z "max
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"  T
Z "max
"q
yn (n; ") g(")d"
with n = n^ and then from Lemma 1, yf < eR. It is easily shown from the above that @n
@T
< 0, so
yf < e
R
 for 
T 0 < p , y
f < e
R
 for all 
T 2
h
T
0
; p
i
. Now dene T as
w = p
Z "max
"min
yn
 
n
 
eR

; "

g(")d"  T
Z "max
"R
yn
 
n
 
eR

; "

g(")d"
= (p  )
Z "max
"min
yn
 
n
 
eR

; "

g(")d"
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Clearly, there exists such a T 2

0; p

for all  2

0; p

. Thus for all T 2 (T ; p]; yf < eR , and for
T = T ; yf = e
R
 by denition. Continuity then implies that
yf <
eR

for all eR > eX and T 2 (T ; p

]
When T < T , equation (10b) no longer holds because it would then imply yf > e
R
 . Also, since
T < p , equation (10a) can not hold simultaneously with (10b) when 
T = T . Therefore, yf = e
R
 ,
n = n, and  = r =  are given by (3).
Finally, it is easily checked that @
T
@eR
< 0.
7.6.3 eR = eX
Here, yf = e
X
 holds for 
T = p simultaneously in both (10b) and (10a) with n = n^. However,
any other value of T < p` is not consistent with either y
f
 
n
 
eX

> e
X
 (as governed by (10a)) or
yf
 
n
 
eX

< e
X
 (as governed by (10b)) because in either case the potential output versus emission cap
mismatch continues to hold for higher values of T which will be violated as T ! p . Hence T = p
for eR = eX .
7.7 Derivations with uniformly distributed shocks and proportional costs
With y (n ; ") =
p
n+"; with "  U [ c; c]) yf (n) = pn; "R = eR  
p
n; ~ya = yf (~n) =
p
~n = p2w ; and
~zmax = ~ymax = 
 
p
2w + c

. To ensure that y
 
n ; "min

> 0, i.e.,
p
n > c, we assume that c < 12
q
peR
w
for all eR < 
 
p
2w + c

, and c < p2w , for all e
R     p2w + c. G  "R = eR  pn+c2c . Evaluating (5b)
with e
X
 = y
f (n^)) "X = 0 obtains eX =  p4w .
Applying proposition 2 equations (10a) and (10b), we have (61) in the main text. Below we verify
that as long as T < T
 
eR

n = n =

eR

2
;
If the above holds, (3), (8), and (11):
 = r +
b   s
2
=  =
1


p  2e
R

w

Thus,
r =
1


p  2e
R

w

  
b   s
2
=    
b   s
2
(28)
We now identify the set of eR and T 2
h
0; p
i
that jointly characterize the three possible permit market
equilibria as stated by (9).
7.7.1 Case I: eR < eX = p4w ;
Suppose T < T = 4 e
R
2 w and 
s = 0, i.e., b < 4w e
R
2 . Then from (28) r + 
b < p : If instead 
b = 0
and s < 4w e
R
2 , r > 
s because eR <  p4w . Thus, the third condition in (9) holds.
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Now if T > T = 4 e
R
2 w proposition 2 equation (10a) yields
w = 
T
2c
Z eR
  
p
n
 c
1
2
p
n
d") pn =
eR
 + c
1 + 4wc=T
(29)
Since T > 4 e
R
2 w,
p
n > e
R
 and r =
p
   b. To obtain , we use (8):
 =
p

  T e
R=  pn+ c
2c
:
which as T ! p reduces to
^ =
p

p
n^+ c  eR=
2c
:
The last expression can also be obtained by using (5b) and (5a). With T < p ; (29) implies
p
n =
eR
 +c
1+4w c
T
<
p
n^ = e
R=+c
1+4w cp
. Thus, yf 2

eR
 ; y^
f

. Finally,
yf   ya = pn  e
R

= c
1  T
T
1 + 4w c
T
> 0;
yf   ya
yf
=
c
eR + c

1  
T
T

The output loss increases with T and reaches its upper bound as T ! p .25
7.7.2 Case II: eR > eX =  p4w ;
Let T < T = 2p 4we
R=
 and 
s = 0, i.e., b < 2p 4we
R=
 . Then from (28) r + 
b < 2p 4we
R=
 =
p
 +
4w


p
4w   e
R


< p and r > s = 0: If b = 0 and s < 2p 4we
R=
 , r =
1


p  2w eR

+ 
s
2 > 
s
and r < 2p 4we
R=
 <
p
 .
Now if T > 2p 4we
R=
 proposition 2 equation (10b) yields
w =
p
2c
Z c
 c
1
2
p
n
d"  
T
2c
Z c
eR
  
p
n
1
2
p
n
d") pn =
eR
 + c

2p
T
  1

1 + 4w c
T
(30)
Obviously, since T > 2p 4we
R=
 ,
p
n = yf (n) < e
R
 , r = 
s, we use equation (8) to get
 = T
p
n+ c  eR
2c
25When T = p

, there is no surplus from trade because r + b =
p

and r = s. If we assume that rms continue to
trade, the loss is given by the above expression with T replaced by p

. On the other hand, if we assume that no trade
occurs when T = p

, all rms with y (n; ") > e
R

are unable to utilize full capacity. Then it can be shown that
yf   ya = c
0@ p2w + c  eR
p
2w
+ 2c
1A2 > 0 for all eR

<
p
2w
+ c:
Thus, the lost output due to capacity underutilization exhibits a discontinuity at T = p

.
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which, again, in the limit as T ! p reduces to ^ obtained earlier. However, since T < p ; input choice
given by (30)
p
n =
eR
 +c

2p
T
 1

1+4w c
T
>
p
n^ =
eR
 +c
1+4w cp
. Now, yf 2

y^f ; e
R


. Finally,
eR   ea = eR  
eR + c

2p
T
  1

1 + 4w c
T
;
eR   ea
eR
=
c
eR
1  T
T
1 + c
eX
p
T
7.7.3 Case III: eR = eX = p4w ;
Let T < T = p and 
s = 0, i.e., b < p . Then from (28) r + 
b <
p 2w eR
 +
p
2 = p and r > 
s = 0:
If b = 0 and s < p , r =
1


p  2w eR

+ 
s
2 =
p
+
s
2 > 
s and r < p . Thus, for all 
T  p ,
yf = yf = y^f = e
X
 :
7.8 Derivations for lognormal shocks and proportional trading costs
For future reference if ln "  N 0; 2, then the following denite integral can be expressed asZ "h
"l
" g (") dy
= exp

2
2



ln "h   2


  

ln "l   2


Also note that
p
n exp

1
2
2

= e
R
 . Then, "
R = exp

1
2
2

G

"Rjn = Pr ln "  1
2
2

= 
 1
2
2   0


= 

1
2


For obtaining eX ; rst obtain n^ :
w =
p
2
p
n^
Z "R
"min
"g (") dy =
p
2
p
n^
exp

2
2


0@ ln

eR=p
n^

  2

1A
When eR = eX
yf (n^) =
p
n^ exp

1
2
2

=
eX

;
Combining the above two gets:
eX = 
p
2w
exp
 
2



 1
2


With n = n,
ya = yf (n) =
p
n exp

1
2
2

=
eR

Following (3):
w =
(p  )
2
p
n
exp

1
2
2

:
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Combining the above two gets:
 =
p  2w eR exp
 2

For eR < eX , to get T use (10a) to get (with eR = 
p
n exp
 
1
2
2

)
w =
T
2
p
n
Z "R
0
"g (") d" =
T
2
p
n
exp

2
2



ln "R   2


=
T
2
p
n
exp

2
2



 1
2


;
Thus,
T =
2weR exp
 2
2
  12
Likewise, for eR > eX , use (10b) to get
T =
1

p  2w eR exp
 2
1     12
To get r for T < T use (7) to get
w = (p  r) 1
2
p
n
exp

1
2
2

+
1
2
p
n
s exp

1
2
2



 1
2


  1
2
p
n
b exp

1
2
2

1  

 1
2


;
which using eR = 
p
n exp
 
1
2
2

simplies to
r =
p  2w eR exp
 2

+ s

 1
2


  b

1
2


= :   b

1
2


+ s

 1
2


(31)
Using G

"Rjn =   12 in (8) gets
 = r + :b

 1
2


  s

1
2


;
which combined with the previous equation gives
 =    T



1
2


  

 1
2


: (32)
Notice that under uniformly distributed additive random shocks,  = , but here  < ;     is
increasing in both T and .
It is worth noting that all of the expressions derived up to now converge to the expressions for
additive uniformly distributed shock when  ! 0. All the di¤erences otherwise are essentially due
to the fact that, unlike a uniform distribution, a log-normal distribution is not symmetric around the
mean.
Once again, we identify the set of eR and T 2
h
0; p
i
that jointly characterize the three possible
equilibria as stated by (9).
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7.8.1 Case I: eR < eX =  p2w exp
 
2


  12 ;
Let T < T =
2w exp( 2) eR
[  12]
and s = 0, i.e., b < T . Then from (31) r + b < p . If 
b = 0 and
s < T , r > s because eR <  p2w exp
 
2


  12.
Now if T > T =
2w exp( 2) eR
[  12]
; proposition 2 equation (10a) yields
w =
T
2
p
n
exp

1
2
2


24 log
h
eR=p
n
i
  2

35 (33)
Clearly, n is increasing in T , and therefore for T 2

T ; p

, n 2 (n; n^), and yf 2

eR
 ; y^
f

: The
rationale behind n < n^ is similar to the one o¤ered in the example with uniform additive shocks.
7.8.2 Case II: eR 2 (eX ; eR]
Let T < T =
p 2w exp( 2) eR
[ 12]
and s = 0, i.e., b <
p 2w exp( 2) eR
[ 12]
. Then, from (31) r + b < p
because
r + b =
p  2w eR exp
 2

+ b

 1
2


<
p  2w eR exp
 2

+
p  2w exp   2 eR


1
2
   1
2


= p+
p
  12  2w exp   2 eR


1
2
| {z }
<0 for eR>eX
If b = 0 and s <
p 2w exp( 2) eR
[ 12]
, r > s because
r =
p  2w exp   2 eR


1
2
  1
2


+ s

 1
2


> s

1
2


+ s

 1
2


= s
The conditions for permit market clearing are thus satised.
However, if T >
p 2w exp( 2) eR
[ 12]
; proposition 2 equation (10b) yields
w =
p
2
p
n
exp

1
2
2
241  T
p
0@1  
24 log
h
eR=p
n
i
  2

351A35
Clearly, n is decreasing in T as can be veried from the above equation. Thus, for T 2

T ; p

,
n 2 (n^; n), and therefore yf 2  y^f ; eR= : There is no output capacity lost because emission permits
are in excess supply. Again, the rationale that n < n^ is the same as o¤ered in the previous example.
32
Case III: eR = eX =  p2w exp
 
2


  12 ; Let T < p and s = 0, i.e., b < p . Then from (31)
r + b =
p 2w eR exp[ 2]
 + 
b
  12 < p and r = p 2w eR exp[ 2]   b  12 > p 2w eR exp[ 2]  
p


1
2

= 0 = s: If b = 0 and s < p , r + 
b =
p 2w eR exp[ 2]
 + 
s
  12 < p and r   s =
p 2w eR exp[ 2]
   s

1
2

> 0. Thus, for all T  p , ya = yf = y^f = yf = e
X
 :
7.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose trade occurs. Then, it must be the case that
p  r > 
b
y (n^; "max)  eR
= p
b
b
; and
r >
s
eR   y (n^; "min) =
p

s
s
combining them together gets
b
b
+
s
s
< 1:
To show the result in the other direction, suppose the above holds and without loss of generality let
b
b
+ 
s
s =  < 1. Fix 
b   b, and dene
x  p  
b
y (n^; "max)  eR
= p

1  
b
b

> 0:
Let r = x    > 0 for  innitesimally small. Some buyers nd it rational to enter the mar-
ket provided there are some sellers willing to sell at r: If b =  b, then s = 0 and all sellers
are active. If b <  b, then s =

  b
b

s =

 p  b
y(n^;"max)  eR

eR
   y
 
n^; "min

<
p  b
y(n^;"max)  eR

eR
   y
 
n^; "min

and there are sellers who nd it rational to sell at r. Trade
occurs. The argument is symmetric for s   s and it holds for all  < 1.
The proof that r 2

0; p

when trade occurs in equilibrium follows from the market clearing, (20).
This condition always holds with equality. The proof is obtained by contradiction. Suppose the LHS
(supply) exceeds the RHS (demand). Then, at the margin r ! 0 and the LHS shrinks to zero. Likewise,
if the RHS exceeds the LHS, at the margin r ! p; and the RHS shrinks to zero.
7.10 Derivations for the example with uniformly distributed shocks and
xed costs
Substituting
p
n^ = p2w
eR
 +c
p
2w+2c
=
( ~z
max
  c)

eR
 +c

~zmax
 +c
(Section 7.6) in b
 
eR

and b
 
eR

as dened in
Proposition 2
b
 
eR
  py  n^  eR ; "max  eR


= p
0@

~zmax
   c

eR
 + c

~zmax
 + c
 

eR

  c
1A
s
 
eR
  p

 
eR   y  n^  eR ; "min = p
0@eR

+ c 

~zmax
   c

eR
 + c

~zmax
 + c
1A
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obtains the expressions in the main text.
When (21) in Proposition 2 holds, equations (17a) and (17b) imply
" =
eR

  
s
r
 pn; " = e
R

+
b
p  r  
p
n:
Substituting these in (19) yields
 =
p
2c
b
p  r +
r
2c

2c  
s
r
  
b
p  r

The pre-production permit price equals its expected marginal market revenue at the production stage
(on the RHS). The probability that a rm with some excess capacity does not enter the permit market
as a buyer is 12c
b
p r ; here, a marginal permit is worth
p
 . The rst term captures the expected
benet. The expected benet of a marginal permit for an inactive rm with excess permits is zero.26
Finally, the probability that a rm is active in the permit market either as a buyer or a seller equals
1
2c

2c  sr   
b
p r

. The above equation simplies to
 = r +
b   s
2c
: (35)
When b 6= s, the pre-production permit price is higher than its post-production value if the buyers
xed costs are higher than that of the sellers. Intuitively, selling is easier than buying in the post-
production permit market, thus raising its ex ante value. Instead, if selling is harder,  < r.
Equations (18) and (20) yield, respectively
yf =
p
n =
p  
2w
=
p  r
2w
  
b   s
2c
; (36)
yf =
p
n =
eR

+
1
4c
"
b
p  r
2
 

s
r
2#
: (37)
where we have utilized (19) in deriving (36). Thus the above two equations along with (35) solve for ,
r, and n. When b = s = , the above two reduce to (23) in the main text.
Clearly, when eR = eX = p4w , r =
p
2 and y
f =
p
n = p4w =
eX
 . That
@r
@eR
< 0 directly follows from
(37) after substituting for n from (36): then (36) implies that @y
f
@eR
> 0. Once @r
@eR
< 0 is shown (37)
implies
yf T e
R

, eR Q eX =  p
4w
as stated in the main text.
Also, note that with b = s = ,
" =
eR

  
r
 pn; " = e
R

+

p  r  
p
n;
"R =
eR

 pn =  
2
4c
"
1
p  r
2
 

1
r
2#
:
Further,
"! "max () "! "min:
26With a probability 1
2c
s
r0 .
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To show this, suppose "! "max, i.e.,
eR

+

p  r  >
p
n+ c:
Then, using (37), we get
eR

  
r
=
p
n  c
which proves the) part. To show the reverse, begin with r = e
R
  
p
n+c to obtain p r =
p
n+c  eR .
Hence, the mass of sellers and buyers in the permit market vanishes simultaneously in the limit. Clearly,
when  satises the above equalities, p rr =
eR
  
p
n^+c
p
n^+c  eR
, and
r = p
p
n^+ c  eR
2c
= p
"
1 
eR
  
p
n^+ c
2c
#
:
Also, then (36) implies27
w = p
eR
  
p
n^+ c
4c
1p
n^
;
p
n^ =
p
4w
eR
 + c
p
4w + c
:
To nd 
 
eR

:

p  r =

p
eR
  
p
n^+c
2c
=
p
n^+ c  e
R

)
 =
p
2c
"
c2  

eR

 
p
n^
2#
=
pc
2
241  eR   p4wp
4w + c
!235 :
To nd r, when  = ,

p  r +

r
= 2c;
(r)
2   p (r) + p
2c
= 0) r = p
2
p
2w + c  e
R

p
4w + c
:
When eR = eX = p4w , 
 
eX

= pc2 , When e
R = ~zmax = 
 
p
2w + c

, then  = 0; 
 
eR

has a minimum
when

eR
   p4w
p
4w+c
2
is maximized. It equals 1 when eR = eX , and it equals pc2
"
1 

4wc2
p   p4w
p
4w+c
2#
when
eR
 =
4wc2
p . Recall that y
min > 0 requires e
R
 >
4wc2
p . For all values of  2 (0; 
 
eR

a permit market
with trading costs exists, and some capacity is unutilized in equilibrium. Alternatively,  can also be
derived as   bs
b+s
; as stated in the main text.
Capacity and permit utilization can be calculated by using (22a) and (22b) as expressed in the main
text. Whether e
a
eR
7 y
yf
requires checking whether

eR
p
n ?

r
p  r
2
Note that as eR ! 0, the RHS !1 and when eR ! ~zmax the RHS ! 0. We already know that LHS
= RHS when eR = eX .
27For ymin  > 0, i.e.,
p
n > c, we assume c < 1
2
q
peR
w
. Since e
R

<
p
~n+ c, this also implies c < p
2w
.
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7.11 yf 6= eX

for eR = eX when b 6= s in the uniform case
The three equilibrium equations are
 = r +
b   s
2c
:;
yf =
p
n =
p  
2w
;
yf =
p
n =
eR

+
1
4c
"
b
p  r
2
 

s
r
2#
:
Let b = 2s: Then
 = r +
s
2c
; p   = p  r   
s
2c
; p  r = 2wpn+ 
s
2c
;
r = p  2wpn  
s
2c
;
p
n =
eR

+
1
4c
"
4

s
2w
p
n+ 
s
2c
2
 

s
p  2wpn  s2c
2#
:
When
p
n = p4w
p
4w
=
eR

+
1
4c
"
4

s
p
2 +
s
2c
2
 

s
p
2   
s
2c
2#
:
Then e
R
 =
p
4w if and only if
p
2
+
s
2c
= 2

p
2
  
s
2c

3
s
2c
=
p
2
;
s =
pc
3
;b =
2pc
3
But when e
R
 =
p
4w , 
b = s = pc and then
s
s
+
b
b
= 1
7.12 yf 6= eX

for eR = eX even when b = s in the log-normal case
Suppose eR = eX and yf =
p
n exp

1
2
2

= eX . For the actively trading rms in the permit market,
this implies
eX (1 G ["] +G ["]) = pn
Z "
0
" g(") dh+
Z 1
"
" g(")dh

;
which in turn requires
1  

ln "  2


+ 

ln "  2


= 1  

ln "


+ 

ln "


;
which can not hold for any  > 0 and  > 0.
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8 Extensions
Below we discuss three variations of our model. The rst questions the validity of our results once the
assumption of linear relationship between emissions and intended output is dropped. Specically, we let
the emissions be convex in (or concave) in output and revisit our key results.28 Next, we explore how the
relationship between trade-impeding cost thresholds are modied when the assumption of irreversible
inputs is dropped. Finally, we argue why our model in Section 2 most parsimoniously ts the framework
proposed by Murty et. al. (2012), by contrasting it with a plausible alternative.
8.1 Non-linear emissions
There is no a priori reason to think that emissions vary linearly in the output as we have proposed in
Section 2. To allow for emissions as a by-product that is convex or concave in the goods output, let
z (y) = y +
1
2
y2:
In case of concave z, we restrict  su¢ ciently enough to ensure that z0 (:) > 0 in the relevant domain
for y. With emissions dened as above, the output produced by rms as expressed in (38) is modied
to
yi  miny  n; "i ; y  ei	 ; (38)
where
y
 
ei

=
8>><>>:
r
2e
 +



2
   , if  > 0
 
r
2e
 +



2
   , if  < 0
Following the outline in the main text, we rst discuss the equilibria under proportional costs and then
under xed costs.
Observe rst that under costless trade
w =
Z "max
"min

p   ( + y (n; "))| {z }

ey
yn (n
; ") g(")d"; (39)
and eR = E [e (y (n; "))] :
In the absence of permit trade w = p
R "R
"min
yn (n^; ") g(")d" with "R determined by eR = e
 
y
 
n; "R

:
It can be checked that Lemma 1 continues to apply with eX  E e  y  n^  eX ; ", and can be restated
as
eR S eX () E e  y  n^  eR ; " T eR: (40)
That is, there is a latent excess demand for permits for all eR < eX , and excess supply for all eR > eX .
8.1.1 Proportional costs
For reasons that become clear below, the two cases of convex and concave emissions are considered
sequentially.
28 Is there a clear evidence on the one versus another?
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Convex emissions:  > 0 Notice that a rm producing y at the margin now requires  + y units
of permits. Thus, permit costs are increasing in the output scale. The rms whose full capac-
ity emissions fall below their permits continue to sell at the market price r as long as r  s.
As for permit buyers, however, the permit opportunity cost is increasing in the output scale. All
rms (whose full capacity emissions exceed their permit holdings) are in the market if and only if 
r + b

( +  y (n; "max) yn (n; "
max)) < p, demanding that the most productive rm derive a positive
surplus from the marginal permit purchase.
Thus, for all s < r < p+ y(n;"max)   b, the input choice continues to be n
 
eR

: eR =
E fe (y (n; "))g ; while r and  are now related by (see 11):
 = (r   s) E

ey yn (n
js)
E

ey yn (n)
 +  r + b E ey yn (njb)
E

ey yn (n)
 :
The equilibrium allocations and utilizations continues to replicate costless trade as long as total cost
s + b < T
 
eR

, which is determined below.
The equilibrium broadly follows the one described in Section 3 and Proposition 2. In case of an
excess demand, when r > s , but r + b = p+ y(n;"c) ; for "
c 2 "R; "max, the input employment is
determined from
w = p
Z "c
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d" 

p
 +  y (n; "c)
  T
Z "R
"min
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
  p
 +  y (n; "c)
Z "c
"R
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d" (41)
Since all permits are sold, the permit market equilibrium requiresZ "c
"min
e
 p
n+ "

g (") d"+ e
 p
n+ "c

(1 G ["c]) = eR (42)
The equilibrium input employment is then determined jointly from (41) and (42).
On the other hand, when there is an excess supply, r = s, and the input choice is determined from
w = p
Z "c
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"  T
Z "c
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"; (43a)
where "c = "max if T  p+ y(n;"max) . Otherwise, "c < "max is determined from T = p+ y(n;"c) .
Now, let n satisfy
w = p
Z "max
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"  p
 +  y (n; "max)
Z "max
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
along with e
 
y
 
n; "R

= eR = E [e (y (n; "))]. The above satises (41) - (43a) with T = p+ y(n;"max) :
all rms with excess permits sell, while all those with permit shortages buy. Dene this level of permits
as eX

and the corresponding input employment as n
 
eX

, which equals that under costless trade.
Using using (41), dene
T
 
eR
  w   p R "
max
"min

1  + y(n;")+ y(n;"max)

yn (n
; ") g(")d"R "R
"min
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
 p
 +  y (n; "max)
The expression follows the same line as in the proof of Proposition 2. For  = 0, and with y (n; ") =
either f (n)+" or "f (n) :we know that T
 
eR

is increasing in eR. Also, for eR and n
 
eR

su¢ ciently
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small, even with  > 0 the result continues to be similar to that under linear emissions, i.e., T
 
eR

is increasing in eR. We conjecture (and verify with our two parametric examples) that T
 
eR

is
increasing in all eR < eX

, with its maximum at T
 
eX

= p
+ y(n(eX);"max)
.
Similarly, using (43a) dene
T
 
eR
  p R "max"min yn (n; ") g(")d"  wR "max
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
 p
 +  y (n; "max)
;
Clearly, T
 
eR

is decreasing in n. It is at its maximum at eX

with T
 
eX

= p
+ y(n(eX);"max)
and therefore the last inequality holds for all eR > eX

.
The above discussion leads to the following:
Conclusion 4 For all T  T  eR, the input employment and equilibrium utilizations are identical to
that under costless trade. T
 
eR

is increasing in eR for all eR < eX

and decreasing for all eR > "X

.
For all T > T
 
eR

, input choice is either determined from (41) and (42) or from (43a). In the
former case, all permits are utilized while some capacity remains utilized; the utilizations are switched
in the latter case.
It can be checked that the excess supply and the excess demand equilibria captured by (41) and
(43a) converge to no trade equilibria as T ! p
+ y(n^(eR);"R)
.
Observe by invoking continuity that there would be a continuum of pairs of

eR; T
 
eR
	
for which
both (41) and (43a) would hold as they do for

eX

; p
+ y(n(eX);"max)

. When (41) holds with
"c < "max, all excess permits holders sell their permit surplus o¤ to the buyers, but there are still rms
that do not produce to their full capacity. Since both (41) and (43a) hold together with T = p+ y(n;"c) ,
the threshold that separates excess demand and excess supply equilibria are now jointly determined by
(42) and
w = p
Z "c
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"  p
 +  y (n; "c)
Z "c
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"; (44a)
Given eR; (42) and (44a) jointly determine n and "c, which in turn determines p+ y(n;"c) . Denote
these set of
n
eR; p
+ y(n(eR);"c)
o
values as

eR; T
c  
eR
	
. Obviously,

eX

; p
+ y(n(eX);"max)

is
one such point on this separating threshold. The end point of this line in the limit as "c ! "R lies atn
eR; p
+ y(n^(eR);"R)
o
: E

e (n^; ") j" < "R = eR. This happens in the limit when eR ! 0 and n^ ! 0.
The above discussion leads to the following:
Conclusion 5 For eR > eX

and for all T 2
h
T
 
eR

; p
+ y(n^(eR);"R)
i
; input employment is de-
termined by (43a) with "c determined from p+ y(n;"c) = 
T . For all eR < eX

and for all T 2
T
 
eR

; T
c  
eR

, input employment is jointly determined from (41) and (42), whereas for all T 2h
T
c  
eR

; p
+ y(n^(eR);"R)
i
; input employment is determined by (43a) with "c determined from p+ y(n;"c) =
T .
Example 6 Let y =
p
n+ ", with "  U [ c; c]. Let p = w = 1 and c = 0:05. Let  =  = 1. Figure 1
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below illustrates various types of equilibria detailed above:
Figure 1
Concave emissions:  < 0 With rms still requiring  + y units of permits at the margin, permit
costs are decreasing in the output scale. The rms whose full capacity emissions fall below their permits
continue to sell at the market price r as long as r  s. Firms whose full capacity emissions exceed
their permit holdings are in the market if and only if
 
r + b
  
 +  y
 
n; "R

< p, requiring that the
least productive rm with "  "R derive a positive surplus from the marginal permit purchase. In case
of an excess demand, when r > s , but r+b = p+ y(n;"c) ; for "
c 2 "R; "max, the input employment
is determined from
w = p
Z "R
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d" 

p
 +  y (n; "c)
  T
Z "R
"min
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
  p
 +  y (n; "c)
Z "max
"c
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"+ p
Z "max
"c
yn (n; ") g(")d" (45)
Since all permits are sold, the permit market equilibrium requiresZ "R
"min
e
 p
n+ "

g (") d"+ eR
 
G ["c] G "R+ Z "max
"c
e
 p
n+ "

g (") d" = eR (46)
The equilibrium is jointly determined by (45) and the above permit market equilibrium
On the other hand, when there is an excess supply, r = s, and the input choice is determined from
w = p
 Z "R
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"+
Z "max
"c
yn (n; ") g(")d"
!
 T
Z "max
"c
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"; (47a)
where "c = "R if T  p
+ y(n;"R)
. Otherwise, "c < "max is determined from T = p+ y(n;"c) .
Now, let n satisfy
w = p
Z "max
"min
yn (n; ") g(")d"  p
 +  y (n; "R)
Z "max
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
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along with e
 
y
 
n; "R

= eR = E [e (y (n; "))]. The above satises both (45) and (47a) with T =
p
+ y(n;"R)
: all rms with excess permits sell, while all those with permit shortages buy. Dene this
level of permits as eX

and the corresponding input employment as n
 
eX

, which equals that under
costless trade.
Using using (45), dene
T
 
eR
  w   p R "
max
" 62["R;"c]

1  + y(n;")
+ y(n;"R)

yn (n
; ") g(")d"R "R
"min
( +  y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
 p
 +  y (n; "R)
Following the argument for convex emissions, T
 
eR

is increasing in eR for  close to 0. Again, we con-
jecture that T
 
eR

is increasing in all eR < eX

, with its maximum at T
 
eX

= p
+ y(n(eX);"R)
.
Similarly, using (43a) dene
T
 
eR
  p R "max"min yn (n; ") g(")d"  wR "max
"R
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"
 p
 +  y (n; "R)
;
Clearly, T
 
eR

is decreasing in n. It is at its maximum at eX

with T
 
eX

= p
+ y(n(eX);"R)
and therefore the last inequality holds for all eR > eX

.
The above discussion leads to the following:
Conclusion 7 For all T  T  eR, the input employment and equilibrium utilizations are identical to
that under costless trade. T
 
eR

is increasing in eR for all eR < eX

and decreasing for all eR > "X

.
For all T > T
 
eR

, input choice is either determined from (45) and (46) or from (47a). In the former
case, all permits are utilized while some capacity remains unutilized; the utilizations are switched in the
latter case.
It can be checked that the excess supply and the excess demand equilibria captured by (45) and
(47a) converge to no trade equilibria as T ! p
+ y(n^(eR);"max)
.
Again, there is a continuum of pairs of

eR; T
 
eR
	
for which both (45) and (47a) hold as they
do for

eX

; p
+ y(n(eX);"R)

. When (45) holds with "c > "R, all excess permits holders sell their
permit surplus o¤ to the buyers, but there are still rms that do not produce to their full capacity. Since
both (45) and (47a) hold together with T = p+ y(n;"c) , the threshold that separates excess demand
and excess supply equilibria are now jointly determined by (46) and
w = p
Z
" 62["R;"c]
yn (n; ") g(")d"  p
 +  y (n; "c)
Z "max
"c
( + y (n; ")) yn (n; ") g(")d"; (48a)
Given eR; (46) and (48a) jointly determine n and "c, which in turn determines p+ y(n;"c) . Denote
these set of
n
eR; p
+ y(n(eR);"c)
o
values as

eR; T
c  
eR
	
. Obviously,

eX

; p
+ y(n(eX);"R)

is one
such point on this separating threshold. The end point of this line in the limit as "c ! "max lies atn
eR; p
+ y(n^(eR);"max)
o
: E

e (n^; ") j" < "R = eR. This happens in the limit when eR ! 0 and n^! 0.
The above discussion leads to the following:
Conclusion 8 For eR > eX

and for all T 2
h
T
 
eR

; p
+ y(n^(eR);"max)
i
; input employment is de-
termined by (47a) with "c determined from p+ y(n;"c) = 
T . For all eR < eX

and for all T 2
41

T
 
eR

; T
c  
eR

, input employment is jointly determined from (41) and (42), whereas for all T 2h
T
c  
eR

; p
+ y(n^(eR);"max)
i
; input employment is determined by (43a) with "c determined from p+ y(n;"c) =
T .
Let y =
p
n + ", with "  U [ c; c]. Let p = w = 1 and c = 0:05. Let  = 1;  =  0:25. Figure 2
below illustrates various types of equilibria detailed above:
Figure 2
8.1.2 Fixed costs
The expected prot of a rm is now given by
E


 
n; e0

=
Z "
"min

py (n; ") + r
 
e0   e (y (n; "))	 g(")d"+ p Z "0
"
y (n; ") g(")d"
+py
 
n; "0
 Z "
"0
g(")d"+
 
py (n; "c)  r  e (y (n; "c))  e0 Z "max
"c
g(")d"
+
Z "c
"

py (n; ")  r  e (y (n; "))  e0	 g(")d"
 sG (") + b (1 G ("))  e0   wn;
where e
 
y
 
n; "0
  e0 and " and " are obtained from
r
0B@e0   e
0B@y (n; ")| {z }
y
1CA
1CA = s;
p
0B@y (n;")| {z }
y
  y  n; "0
1CA  r
0B@e
0B@y (n;")| {z }
y
1CA  e0
1CA = b:
The fourth term in the prot expression captures the fact that under convex emissions high productivity
rms cap their emissions at e (y (n; "c)) ; where "c is determined in equilibrium from
rey (y (n; "
c)) = p
42
if "c < "max. Otherwise, "c = "max and the fourth term does not exist.
The rst order condition for the input employment in equilibrium is given by
w =
Z "
"min
(p  re0 (y (n; "))) yn g(")d"+ p
Z "0
"
yn (n; ") g(")d"
+pyn
 
n; "0
 Z "
"0
g(")d"+ (p  re0 (y (n; "c)))| {z }
=0 i¤ "c<"max
yn (n; "
c)
Z "max
"c
g(")d"
+
Z "c
"
(p  re0 (y (n; "))) yn g(")d"
with e0 = eR.
Similar to the condition described in Proposition 2 in the main text, below we derive a condition
that determines cost thresholds that separate trade and no-trade equilibria for a given value of emission
cap. Suppose
r
 
eR   e (y (n^; "min))

> s;
p
 
y (n^; "max)  y  n^; "R  r  e (y (n^; "max))  eR > b:
The rst and the second condition respectively drive the sellers and buyers out of the permit market.
For the symmetric case, letting b = s = , combining the two above gets the required condition:
 < 
 
eR
  p eR   e  y  n^  eR ; "min  y  n^  eR ; "max  y  n^; "R
e (y (n^ (eR) ; "max))  e (y (n^ (eR) ; "min))
which for the uniform case as a counterpart to equation (24) in the main text reduces to

 
eR

=
p
2

eR   n^  eR+ c  12  n^  eR  c2
 + n^ (eR)

1  "
R
c

(51)
with
n^
 
eR

=
p
4w
p
4w + c
0@s

2
+ 2
eR

  

+ c
1A
"R =
c
p
4w + c
0@s

2
+ 2
eR

  

  p
4w
1A
For p = w = 1 and c = 0:05 and  =  = 1, Figure 3 below veries that the cost thresholds are very
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similar to that with linear emissions.
Figure 3
Under concave emissions, the fourth term in the prot function described above does not exist.
When a rm with " breaks even by purchasing at r; all rms with " > ", having a lower marginal
emission (ey) at their output scale will also nd it optimal to purchase additional permits and produce
to full capacity. The cost threshold continues to be dened by (51), but now
n^
 
eR

=
p
4w
p
4w + c
0@ 
s


2
+ 2
eR

  

+ c
1A
"R =
c
p
4w + c
0@ 
s


2
+ 2
eR

  

  p
4w
1A
For p = w = 1 and c = 0:05 and  = 1;  =  0:25, Figure 4 below veries that the cost thresholds are
very similar to that with linear emissions.
Figure 4
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8.2 Equilibrium with reversible inputs
With reversible inputs, rms trade and acquire emission permits e0 = eR in a pre-production market at
per unit price : After the permits are obtained, they draw their productivity. Without any emission
cap, their optimal input employment follows
pyn (n; ") = w:
A rm with higher productivity realization employs a larger amount of input. The optimal n ("; p; w)
depends on " and input/output prices. In what follows, to avoid clutter, we continue to use n without
its arguments.
With emission caps, there are two possibilities. If permits can be traded, the optimal input employ-
ment is given by
yn (n; ") =
w
p   ; (52)
and in equilibrium:
ya =
Z
y (n; ") g (") d" =
eR

(53)
In the absence of trade, and assuming that the emission cap binds for all rms, input employment
follows
y (n; ") =
eR

and once again (53) holds. Here, a rm with higher productivity employs a smaller amount. The choice
problem is trivial.
Allocations implied by (52) and (53) replicate the allocations of a planner who only faces aggregate
constraint ya = eR, whereas no-trade outcome implies a constraint on each rm. Thus, the two
outcomes are di¤erent producing the same output would utilize more inputs in the absence of trade.
8.2.1 Proportional transactions costs
Assume that all rms in equilibrium hold e0 = eR units of permits before realizing their productivity.
After their productivity realization, rms employ inputs by solving their prot maximization problem:
max
8<: maxn
s

py (ns ; ")  (r   s)  y (ns; ")  eR  wns	 ;
maxnb

py
 
nb ; "
   r + b  y (n; ")  eR  wnb	 ;
py (na; ")  wna;
9=;
A rm here faces a discrete choice of whether to enter the permit market or stay out. If it stays out,
it just produces its autarkic amount y (na; ") = e
R
 . Otherwise, it either sells or buys given its optimal
input employment in either case.
Sellersand buyersoptimal input employments are respectively characterized by
yn (n
s; ") =
w
p   (r   s) ; yn
 
nb; "

=
w
p   (r + b) : (54)
For a seller y (ns; ")  eR ; whereas for a buyer y
 
nb; "
  eR . Further, since ynn < 0 and yn"  0, (54)
implies that there exist "b > "s such that29
yn (n
s; ") =
w
p   (r   s) for all "  "
s; (55a)
yn
 
nb; "

=
w
p   (r + b) for all "  "
b: (55b)
29A proof is o¤ered by contradiction. Suppose "b  "s. Since yn
 
nb; "b

> yn (ns; "s) for either b or s > 0. Since
ynn < 0 and yn"  0; "s  "b requires ns > nb, which invalidates the equilibrium y
 
nb; "b
  e0

 y (ns; "s).
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Furthermore,
y (na; ") =
eR

for all " 2 "s; "b (56)
Finally, the marginal rm at either "s and "b must be indi¤erent between being in or out of the permit
market:
y
 
nb; "b

= y (ns; "s) =
eR

. (57)
When trade occurs in equilibrium, we also requireZ "s
"min
 
eR    y (ns ; ") g (") d" = Z "max
"b
 
 y
 
nb ; "
  eR g (") d" (58)
Thus given

s; b
	
equations (55a) - (57) determine r; ns (") ; nb (") ; "b; and "s in equilibrium.
To illustrate how trade costs

s; b
	
impede/preclude permit trade, we resort to the parametric
example studied in the main text.
A parametric Example Let
y (n; ") =
p
n+ "; "  U [ c; c]
We restrict eR     p2w   c to ensure that the cap is utilized by all rms even in the absence of trade.
We further need e
R
 > c to make sure that
Then choices ns and nb are independent of ". Specically,
p
ns =
p   (r   s)
2w
;
p
nb =
p    r + b
2w
; (59)
which using (56) gets
p
ns  
p
nb = "b   "s =  
b + s
2w
= 
T
2w
: (60)
On the other hand, (58) along with the preceding result gets
p
ns +
p
nb
2
=
eR

;
The preceding two results obtain sellersand buyersinput employment as
p
ns =
eR

+ 
T
4w
;
p
nb =
eR

   
T
4w
:
while permit price is obtained using (59) as
r =
p

  2we
R
2
+
s   b
2
Allocations thus depend solely on the total cost T and not on b and s separately. Trading costs
create a wedge between sellersand buyersopportunity costs of permits and distort input employment
accordingly. Sellers end up employing a higher amount of inputs while buyers input employment is
depressed. When T = 0, ns = nb, i.e., all rms employ an identical amount. On the other hand, when
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T = 4wc , all rms produce equal output and emissions and their input employment trivially follows
from p
n0 =
eR

  "
Figure 5 below illustrates how input allocations distort with increase in total cost. The horizontal line
represents T = 0, z-shaped represents T = 2wc . The allocations return to autarky with 
T = 4wc
shown with dashed line.
Figure 5
In addition, trade requires
r + b =
p

  2we
R
2
+
T
2
<
p

) 
T
4w
< 2
eR

;
r   s = p

  2we
R
2
  
T
2
> 0) 
T
4w
<
p
4w
  2e
R

:
Under an equilibrium with trade, both conditions must hold. Similar to irreversible inputs, there is an
upper bound on total costs which precludes trade:
T
 
eR
  ( 4eRw2 for eR <  p4w2p
   4e
Rw
2 for e
R 2  p4w ;  p2w  (61)
The above bounds are identical to those for irreversible inputs studied in the main text (see equation
(14)). There, these bounds impede trade partially. Here, in contrast, trade ceases completely once these
bounds are crossed. The rst bound for eR <  p4w ensures a buyers participation, while the one for
eR >  p4w ensures non-negative surplus for the sellers.
However, (61) has to be consistent with (60), which requires T < 4wc . Suppose p < 4wc. Then,
T
 
eR

= 4e
Rw
2 for all e
R <  p4w . If instead p > 4wc, 
T
 
eR

= 4e
Rw
2 for all e
R < c and T
 
eR

= 4wc
for all eR 2 c;  p4w . Similarly, if p < 4wc, T  eR = 2p   4eRw2 for all eR >  p4w . Instead if p > 4wc,
T
 
eR

= 4wc for all e
R < 
 
p
2w   c

and T
 
eR

= 2p   4e
Rw
2 for all e
R 2    p2w   c ;  p2w  :
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E¢ ciency Total output produced is e
R
 . Total inputs employed equal
1
2c times
2
 
eR

2
+


T
4w
2!
c   
T
4w

+

eR

2
2
T
4w
+
1
3
2


T
4w
3
= 2c
 
eR

2
+


T
4w
2!
  4
3


T
4w
3
Excess input employment is measured by
 
T
4w
2
  23c

 
T
4w
3

eR

2
which increases in  
T
4w 2 [0; c], with its maximum at c
2
3 =

eR

2
8.2.2 Fixed costs
With xed costs, all trading rms that are in the market face the same marginal opportunity cost and
their input employment follows
yn
 
nT ; "

=
w
p  r
Here, superscript T denotes trading rms. Firms with su¢ ciently low productivities have excess permits
and those with high productivities fall short of them, and there again exist "s and "b such that
r =
s
eR   y (n; "s)
p  r = 
b
y (n; "b)  eR
Again, permit market equilibrium requiresZ "s
"min
 
eR   y (n; ") g(") d" = Z "max
"b
 
y (n; ")  eR g(") d":
Firms that are not in the market produce their autarkic amount:
y (na; ") =
eR

for all " 2 "s; "b
Thus given

s; b
	
and input/output prices the preceding system of equations determines r; n (") ; "b;
and "s in equilibrium.
To illustrate how trade costs

s; b
	
impede/preclude permit trade, we resort to the parametric
example studied for the proportional case.
8.2.3 A parametric example
Let
y (n; ") =
p
n+ "; "  U [ c; c]
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Then, for trading rms, denoted by superscript T , we have
p
nT =
p  r
2w
;
The cut o¤ productivities are given by
"s =
eR

  p  r
2w
  
s
r
; "b =
eR

  p  r
2w
+
b
p  r (62)
Using above results with the permit market clearing obtains (identical to that obtained in the main
text for irreversible investments):
p
nT =
p  r
2w
=
eR

+
1
4c
 
b
p  r
2
 

s
r
2!
(63)
Those under autarky, denoted by superscript a, choose
p
na =
eR

  "
Using (62) and (63) It can be shown that "b ! c , "s !  c. For the symmetric case (as in the main
text) b = s = . The value of  that obtains "b ! c and "s !  c is
 =
pc
2
"
1 

eR    p4w
 p4w + c
2#
;
thus obtaining exactly the same cost threshold as under irreversible investments in the main text.
8.3 Emission/abatement proportional to inputs
Suppose z = m, where m  n is input used in production, where n is the input irreversibly employed
before " is realized. First, consider the equilibrium under costless trade. When z = y, all rms have a
positive net benet from input use at the production stage, i.e., (p  r) ym > 0, and therefore utilize
all their inputs. Firms with high productivity produce and emit more than the average by buying
permits, while those with low productivity produce and emit less. With z = m, the net marginal
benet p ym    r may be negative for some rms with su¢ ciently low productivity if they attempt to
utilize their full capacity. In this case, they may choose to utilize m < n, and some of them may even
benet by selling their permits o¤ by employing m < e
R
 . On the other hand, rms with su¢ ciently
large productivity may employ m 2 ( eR ; n] by purchasing additional permits in the market. This ex
post scenario may lead to rms ex ante employing inputs n > e
R
 . Of course, if ex ante n  e
R
 , there
is no ex post trade in equilibrium. In general, as we nd below, n > e
R
 is likely to hold only when
eR
 << ~n.
When z = m, an output technology of the form y (m; ") = y (m) + " rules out any ex-post trade.
To see this, note that the marginal input cost (opportunity cost of emissions) is r whereas its marginal
value product is pym (m; "). A rm will employ all its inputs as long as pym (n; ")  r. If not, it will use
m < n : ym (m; ") = r. Since all rms begin with n, all rms will use same amount of input regardless
of their " and generate the same amount of emissions. Therefore, y (m; ")  "y (m) is assumed in what
follows. Below we summarize the key features of equilibria under (a) no permit trade (b) costless trade,
and (c) with proportional trading costs.
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8.3.1 No trade in permits
Here, the problem is trivial: choose n = m from
pyen (n) = w
if
pyen

eR


< w
Otherwise
n =
eR

8.3.2 Costless trade in permits
Assuming that a rm enters the production stage with e0 = eR units of emission permits, the prot
maximization problem at the production stage is
py (m; ")  r  m  eR subject to m  n
The optimality demands that for all rms with " < "^, m is given by
pym (m; ") = r (64)
whereas for all " > "^ : pyn (n; "^) = r
pyn (n; ") > r
and m = n. These are the rms that would have liked to employ more inputs if they could.
Finally, aggregate permit market clearing requires thatZ "^
"min
m (") g (") d"+ n (1 G ("^)) = e
R

(65)
In the planning stage, a rm knows its state-contingent choices after " is realized, can rationally forecast
the equilibrium r, and therefore ex ante chooses e0 and n to maximize its expected protZ "^
"min
[py (m (") ; ")  r0m (")] g (") d"+
Z "max
"^
[py (n; ")  r0n] g (") d"  wn+ re0   e0
which gets by arbitrage
r = :
The optimal choice of n follows
p
Z "max
"^
yn (n; ") g (") d" = w + r (1 G ("^)) (66)
Recall that "^ solves yn (n; "^) = rp : There are two unknowns: r and n: They are obtained from (65) and
(66).
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A parametric example with trade An additive productivity shock would imply that rms ex-post
employ an identical amount of inputs and generate identical emissions which would obviate any ex post
permit trade. Therefore, for this part we resort to
y (n; ") = "
p
n; ln "~N (0; ) :
The production stage choice (64) gets
"
2
p
m
=
r
p
; m =
1
4
"2p2
2r2
:
The cuto¤ is given by
"^ = 2
p
n
r
p
And the input choice follows from (66):
p
n =
p
2
exp

1
2
2

1  

ln 2
p
n rp  2


w + r

1  

ln 2
p
n rp

 (67)
and the permit market equilibrium requires
1
4
p2
2r2
exp

22


"
ln 2
p
n rp   22

#
+ n
 
1  
"
ln 2
p
n rp

#!
=
eR

(68)
Thus, n and r are jointly determined by (67) and (68).
Finally, the aggregate output produced under trade equals
y =
1
2
p
r
exp

22


"
ln 2
p
n rp   22

#
+
p
n exp

1
2
2
 
1  
"
ln 2
p
n rp   2

#!
8.3.3 Proportional trading costs
Trading costs, once again, place a wedge between buyers and sellers and generate respective ex post
output/abatement choices. As a result, there are three productivity thresholds:

"s; "b; "^
	
such that
rms below "s sell, those above "b buy, those with " 2  "s; "b stay out of the market, and those above
"^ not only buy but also use all inputs to produce and do no abatement. These cuto¤s follow from
"s
2
p
ms
=
 (r   s)
p
;
"b
2
p
mb
=

 
r + b

p
; "^ = "b
r
n
mb
:
Since at the margin ms = mb = e
R
 ,
"s
"b
=
r   s
r + b
:
Again, the two unknowns r and n are determined jointly from ex ante input choice:
p
2
p
n
Z "max
"^
"g (") d" = w + 
 
r + b

(1 G ("^))
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and the permit market equilibriumZ "s
"min
m (") g (") d"+
Z "^
"b
m (") g (") d"+ n (1 G ("^)) = e
R

 
1 
Z "b
"s
g (") d"
!
:
With our parametric assumptions, these are, respectively:
p
n =
p
2
exp

1
2
2
 
1  
"
ln 2
p
n
(r+b)
p  2

#!
w +  (r + b)
 
1  
"
ln 2
p
n
(r+b)
p

#! (69)
and
eR

=
1
4
p2
2(r s)2 exp

22


24 ln2p  (r s)p  22

35
+ 14
p2
2(r+b)2
exp

22

0BBBBBBBB@

264 ln
 
2
p
n
(r+b)
p
!
 22

375
 
264 ln
 
2
p


(r+b)
p
!
 22

375
1CCCCCCCCA
+n
0B@1  
264 ln
 
2
p
n
(r+b)
p
!

375
1CA

1  

ln

2
q


(r+b)
p

+ 

ln

2
q


(r s)
p

where n follows from (69).
Figure 6 below shows how the mass of various trading and non-trading groups vary with symmetric
trading costs b = s = . For this example, we assume w = 1; p = 100; and  = 0:2: With  = 1,
unconstrained amount of emissions are ~za =
 
p
2w
2
exp

2

: Let eR = 0:01~za. The gure below exhibits
how trading costs separate rms population in four groups. Full-emittersare rms that utilize 100%
inputs and emit to their full capacity. Sellersare those who utilize less than their full capacity and sell
a part of their permits to full-emitters as well as to some other buyers, i.e., rms that do not utilize
full capacity yet need extra permits to produce at their optimum. Finally, there are Non-traders, i.e.,
rms that neither buy nor sell but simply use m = e
R
 to fully utilize their permit holdings.
Intuitively, as trading costs increase, the mass of traders buyers that produce less than capacity
and sellers - shrink to zero. The entire population of rms is either out of market or producing and
emitting at their full capacity. A natural question to ask is that if the mass of sellers is shrinking, how
are full-emitters, i.e., rms that were utilizing full capacity by buying permits from sellers, could still
be about the same? This is explained by the ex ante input employment that takes into account the ex
post market equilibrium. As costs increase, in the absence of trade, all rms indeed employ the same
amount of input. As a result, n approaches e
R
 :
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Figure 6
The distribution changes to for eR = 0:1~za for varying trading costs are exhibited below (labels
correspond to those in Figure 6 above)
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Figure 7
Clearly, about 90% of the population utilizes all of its inputs while about 10% sell some of their
permits to these full-emitters when the trade is costless. As costs increase sellers shrink and non-traders
increase. In fact, the input used by non-traders and full emitters coincides as can be seen in the Figure
8 below that shows how e
R
n changes with
eR
~za . The curve that lies below represents trading costs of 20%.
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It illustrates how quickly the input choice approach its common level of e
R
 when the cost goes up from
20% to 30% (represented by the curve that lies above)
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